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SECRET JURISDICTION
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ABSTRACT
So-called “confidentiality creep” after the events of 9/11 has given rise to
travel restrictions that lack constitutionality and do nothing to improve airline
security. The Executive Branch’s procedures for imposing such restrictions
rely on several layers of secrecy: a secret standard for inclusion on the no-fly
list, secret procedures for nominating individuals to the list, and secret
evidence to support that decision. This combination results in an overall
system we call “secret jurisdiction,” in which individuals wanting to challenge
their inclusion on the list are unable to learn the specific evidence against
them, the substantive standard for their inclusion on the list, or the process
used to put them there. The Executive Branch has argued that its decision to
put someone on the no-fly list should be judged by a minimal “reasonable
suspicion” standard. It has further stated that any plaintiff wishing to be
removed from the list must demonstrate that the government’s suspicions are
unreasonable, and must do so without hearing the evidence that led to those
suspicions in the first place.
The momentum may have finally shifted with the litigation in Latif v.
Holder, which recently led a federal court to recognize for the first time that, at
a minimum, individuals have a due-process right to learn whether they are on
the list and to have at least some opportunity to challenge their inclusion on
the list. Many questions still remain, and no court has yet resolved the question
of what “due process” means for individuals subjected to travel restrictions
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based on confidential government watchlists. We argue that a traditional
procedural due process analysis is insufficient to protect individual rights
when national security requires that much of the information relevant to that
analysis be kept secret. To counter this deficit, we suggest that courts should
incorporate elements of substantive due process by applying a unified due
process standard that requires a higher evidentiary burden—and real evidence
of national security benefits—before the government may curtail significant
individual liberties.
I. INTRODUCTION
Flying is a ubiquitous part of many people’s lives. Every day, eight million
individuals fly.1 We fly for work. We fly to visit loved ones and be present for
births, graduations, weddings, and funerals. We fly to fulfill religious
obligations or to go marvel at the beauty of various parts of the world. What if
you were told you can never fly again? Would you feel like a prisoner in your
own country? Like an exilee if trapped abroad? Certainly you would want to
find out why an airline or government is telling you that you cannot board
another plane ever again, or beyond one last time. If told that you have been
deemed a danger to public safety, you would demand an explanation. And it
better be good.
Now picture that when you ask for such an explanation, none is given to
you. No more business trips, weddings, vacations, visits to relatives. Instead,
you are stuck in a Kafkaesque nightmare replete with faceless bureaucrats, or
with FBI agents who tell you that, sure, they can help you out—but only if you
become an informant for them. When you attempt to challenge your placement
on the list in court, the government first argues that national security forbids
you from making any challenge at all.2 After the court holds that due process
requires you to be allowed to challenge your placement on the list, the
1 Press Release, Int’l Air Transp. Ass’n, New Year’s Day 2014 Marks 100 Years of Commercial
Aviation (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2013-12-30-01.aspx.
2 Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Complaint at 34–37, 41, Latif v. Holder,
No. 3:10-cv-00750-BR, 2011 WL 1667471 (May 3, 2011) (“The government does not publicly confirm or
deny whether particular individuals are now or ever have been listed in the TSDB, because to do so would in
effect disclose the fact that the individuals in question are currently or once were the subjects of
counterterrorism intelligence-gathering or investigative activity by the federal government. Moreover, if the
government were to disclose watchlist status, individuals who know they are on the TSDB could take steps to
avoid detection and circumvent surveillance. Similarly, the disclosure that someone is not on the TSDB might
lead that person to take advantage of that fact, so that he or she is in a better position to commit a terrorist act
against the U.S. before he or she comes to the attention of government authorities.” (citations omitted)).
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government begrudgingly modifies its position only slightly: now, it says, you
may challenge your placement on the list, but the burden of proof is on you.3
Furthermore, it argues, the court should apply a deferential “reasonable
suspicion” standard—it is not enough to prove that you have not been involved
in any act of terrorism, but instead, you must prove that the government has no
reasonable basis even to suspect you of terrorist involvement.4 And for an
added degree of difficulty, you must prove the unreasonableness of any
suspicion about you without learning what information caused the government
to suspect you in the first place and without being granted a hearing at which
you might cross-examine witnesses or otherwise challenge the government’s
evidence.5
There is no way even to know if your viewpoints or religious affiliation
were used in these determinations in contravention of the First Amendment
because lodging a complaint to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
or the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) will only result in “the
need to ascertain that the complaint is based on a positive match to the No Fly
List.”6 Indeed, the government openly proclaims its latitude in deciding what
information to use in its decisions when it states that “nominations must not be
based solely on race, ethnicity, national origin, religious affiliation, or activities
protected by the First Amendment.”7 One individual on the no-fly list has
alleged in his legal filings that he was treated this way “in part because of
certain alleged statements that, if accurately described in the letter, are plainly
protected under the First Amendment.”8 Secrecy provides a wall behind which
the government can hide unconstitutional activity and engage in discrimination
of individuals whose opinions or personas are considered undesirable.

3

See Defendant’s Consolidated Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and Opposition at 50–53, Latif v. Lynch, No. 3:10-cv-00750-BR, 2016 WL 1239925 (D. Or. Mar.
28, 2016) [hereinafter Defendant’s Consolidated Memorandum] (arguing that the plaintiffs bear the burden of
proof to establish that the government erred in concluding that there was “reasonable suspicion” of the
individuals added to the no-fly list); Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1143 (D. Or. 2014) (explaining that
the court will not review the petition unless the administrative record does not support the petitioner’s
inclusion on the list).
4 Latif, 28 F. Supp 3d at 1153.
5 Id. at 1152–53.
6 JEFFREY KAHN, MRS. SHIPLEY’S GHOST: THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND TERRORIST WATCHLISTS 190–91
(2013).
7 Declaration of Michael Steinbach at 6, Latif, 2016 WL 1239925 (emphasis added).
8 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff Steve Washburn’s Renewed Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment at 24–25, Latif, 2016 WL 1239925.
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These are the types of scenarios that thousands of individuals on America’s
no-fly list have encountered. As one scholar has stated, the list “operates in
total secrecy. And its effect is sudden, unpredictable, and absolute.”9 Created
under the administration of President George W. Bush and maintained under
that of President Barack Obama, the U.S. Terrorist Screening Center (TSC),
housed within the FBI, uses its discretion to decide who should be placed on or
off the list of individuals who are permitted to fly.10 And when making these
decisions, scholar Jeffrey Kahn explained that officials would rather “err on
the side of watchlisting. After all, why take a risk?,” and further described,
“Who wants to be the one to let a terrorist slip onto a plane? When the buck
stops with no one, no one has a reason to stop.”11
The intent of the no-fly list is to identify individuals who may present a risk
of engaging in terrorist activity.12 The government asserts that its decision to
add an individual to the list should be judged by a deferential “reasonable
suspicion” standard—a substantive standard even lower than “probable cause,”
that was originally developed to assess the validity of a minor traffic stop.13
Congress, however, never specified the substantive standard by which to
measure the risk; it merely authorized the Executive Branch to “notify
appropriate law enforcement agencies, prevent the individual from boarding an
aircraft, or take other appropriate action with respect to that individual” after
identifying the individual believed to pose such a risk.14
The Executive Branch’s overly broad interpretation of the congressional
directive has created a list whose scope is neither clear nor rational, and whose
effect is almost entirely disconnected from law enforcement activity. In fact,
one U.S. citizen on the list alleges that when he found himself unable to fly
back to the United States, he was explicitly told by the FBI that the
9

KAHN, supra note 6, at 72–73.
Ten Years After: The FBI Since 9/11, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/ten-years-after-the-fbi-since9-11/just-the-facts-1/terrorist-screening-center-1 (last visited July 31, 2015).
11 See KAHN, supra note 6, at 143, 156.
12 49 U.S.C. § 114(h)(3) (2012) (authorizing the TSA “to use information from government agencies to
identify individuals on passenger lists who may be a threat to civil aviation or national security” and to “notify
appropriate law enforcement agencies, prevent the individual from boarding an aircraft, or take other
appropriate action with respect to that individual”).
13 See infra note 254 and accompanying text; see also Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
at 18, Latif, 2016 WL 1239925 [hereinafter Defendant’s Cross-Motion], https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/
files/field_document/251%20Defendants%20Cross%20Motion%20for%20Summary%20Judgment_0.pdf
(“By its very nature, identifying individuals who ‘may be a threat to civil aviation or national security’ is a
predictive judgment intended to prevent future acts of terrorism in an uncertain context.”).
14 49 U.S.C. § 114(h)(3).
10
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government is not actually concerned about him and that he should fly to
Mexico and then cross into the United States on land.15 Other individuals on
the list have reportedly gotten around the list by flying on private jets16 or
travelling on cruise ships.17
In addition, placement on the no-fly list or a related watchlist does not
trigger many, if any, non-travel security restrictions—thus, for example, when
individuals in the database sought to purchase firearms, they succeeded 90% of
the time.18 Other individuals found in the Terrorist Screening Database have
been approved for employment within the secure areas of airports.19 Finally,
law enforcement agencies at times choose not to place some of the most
dangerous people on the list because it would disrupt investigative efforts to
share this information with the airlines whose charge it is to prevent the

15 See John Solomon & Brian Ross, US Apologizes to Billionaire Added to Terror No-Fly List, ABC
NEWS (May 21, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/us-apologizes-billionaire-added-terror-fly-list/story?id=
10698917.
16 See Matthew Mosk, Eric Longabardi & Richard Esposito, Want to Fly Through a Loophole in the NoFly List? Buy a Plane, ABC NEWS (Mar. 23, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/terrorism-loophole-fly-list/
story?id=10149211.
17 See Matthew Barakat, Michael Migliore, US Citizen, Allegedly Detained After Cruise to England,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 12, 2011, 4:46 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/12/michael-miglioreus-citiz_n_958992.html.
18 Ailsa Chang, People on Terrorism Watch List Not Blocked from Buying Guns, NPR (Apr. 24, 2013,
8:49 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2013/04/24/178668578/people-on-terror-watch-list-notblocked-from-buying-guns. In light of the recent Paris attacks, Senator Dianne Feinstein has proposed
blocking individuals in the database from being allowed to purchase guns. See Karoun Demirjian, After Paris
Attacks, Democrats Call For More Gun Control For Those on Terror Watchlist, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/11/19/in-response-to-paris-attacks-democrats-callfor-more-gun-control-for-those-on-terror-watchlist/. President Obama followed suit after the San Bernardino
attack, stating that “Congress should act to make sure no one on a no-fly list is able to buy a gun. What could
possibly be the argument for allowing a terrorist suspect to buy a semi-automatic weapon? This is a matter of
national security.” Barack Obama, U.S. President, Address to the Nation (Dec. 6, 2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/06/address-nation-president. The “argument” against
this, of course, is the haphazard way in which individuals end up on the no-fly list or watchlists in the first
place, as we discuss in this Article. Many commentators immediately criticized the President’s remarks on that
and similar bases. See, e.g., Josh Sanburn, Banning Gun Sales to People on No-Fly List May Not Be
Constitutional, Experts Say, TIME (Dec. 11, 2015), http://time.com/4146025/guns-no-fly-list-constitution/
(explaining that the idea of “no fly, no gun” may be unconstitutional). That said, at least one state,
Connecticut, plans to implement this idea via executive order and outlaw the sale of guns to individuals on the
no-fly list or other government watchlists. See Elizabeth A. Harris & Eric Lichtblau, Connecticut to Ban Gun
Sales to Those on Federal Terrorism Lists, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/11/
nyregion/connecticut-to-ban-gun-sales-to-those-on-federal-terrorism-lists.html.
19 See TSA Can Improve Aviation Worker Vetting (Redacted), OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN. (June 4, 2015),
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2015/OIG_15-98_Jun15.pdf.
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members of the list from boarding.20 All this has resulted in a no-fly list that is
both arbitrary in scope and ineffective to protect national security.
In spite of the list’s ineffectiveness for law enforcement, the government
has argued that disclosing particular security procedures that dictate inclusion
on the no-fly list and related watchlists “could enable terrorists and other
violent criminals to identify potential weaknesses in the current security
system, and to circumvent or otherwise defeat the security measures mandated
by the TSA in the Directives.”21 The agency similarly stated that disclosing the
names on the no-fly list would create security risks.22
Defending against inclusion on the no-fly list thus becomes an exercise in
shadow boxing.23 Not only has the government not had to disclose the facts
that led to a person’s inclusion, but it has argued that the court should judge
inclusion by the “reasonable suspicion” standard even though it is a secret
whether that was the standard the government itself used or not.24 In this setup,
an individual has to prove a negative—that he is not deserving of suspicion and
that the government has acted unreasonably in treating him as such—all the
while not knowing what evidence, if any, led the government to be suspicious
in the first place.
This Article argues that the no-fly list has suffered from the confidentiality
creep25 that has pervaded much of national security matters since 9/11, and that

20

See infra text accompanying note 239–43.
Declaration of Lee S. Longmire at 3, Green v. TSA, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 7, 2005)
(No. C04-763Z).
22 Id. at 3–4.
23 It is certainly not the first time in U.S. history that this happens given the intermittent practice of
denying passports fairly arbitrarily, which caused one judge in the 1950s to comment:
21

How can an applicant refute charges which arise from sources, or are based upon evidence,
which is closed to him? What good does it do him to be apprised that a passport is denied him
due to associations or activities disclosed or inferred from State Department files even if he is
told of the associations and activities in a general way? What files? What evidence? Who made
the inferences? From what materials were those inferences made?
Boudin v. Dulles, 136 F. Supp. 218, 221 (D.D.C. 1955).
24 See Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1153 (D. Or. 2014) (stating that in the government’s eyes,
“[j]udicial review only extends to whether the government reasonably determined the traveler meets the
minimum substantive derogatory criteria; i.e., the reasonable suspicion standard. Thus, the fundamental flaw at
the administrative-review stage (the combination of a one-sided record and a low evidentiary standard) carries
over to the judicial-review stage”).
25 Confidentiality creep has been defined as the “quiet, under-scrutinized expansion of the kinds of
information deemed inappropriate for public consumption.” David Levine, Confidentiality Creep and the
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the way it has been operated not only lacks constitutionality but also does
nothing to improve airline security. Rejecting the current model, this Article
proposes a new standard that combines the elements of procedural and
substantive due process and mandates a higher burden of proof before the
government can put an individual on the no-fly list.
In Part II, this Article discusses the growth of secrecy as part of the
government apparatus since 9/11 and how its use has affected the
implementation of the no-fly list. Part III presents the procedural and
substantive due process failures that the list currently entails. Part IV then
argues in favor of a new, unified standard by which to evaluate each
individual’s placement on the no-fly list in a way that cures existing
constitutional ills.
II. SECRECY, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE NO-FLY LIST
This Part discusses the history and growth of the no-fly list. It situates the
development of the list in the context of the general expansion of government
powers that followed 9/11. The focus is on how secrecy became an
increasingly used tool in the fight against terrorism, and how this turned into a
significant obstacle for people seeking redress against false suspicions.
Secrecy, as this Part shows, operates like a sticky spider web for which
innocence does not provide an easy escape, when it provides one at all.
A. Development of the No-Fly List
The no-fly list is created and maintained by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s Terrorist Screening Center (TSC).26 The TSC shares the list
with the TSA so that the latter can pre-screen airline passengers.27 The TSC
obtains “nominations” for inclusion in the Terrorist Screening Database from
various federal departments and agencies, including the National
Counterterrorism Center and the FBI, and it is supposed to add a nominated
individual to the database if it concludes that there is a “reasonable suspicion”
based on “articulable facts” and “rational inferences” that the individual “is
known or suspected to be, or has been engaged in conduct constituting, in

Death Penalty, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (July 31, 2015, 3:21 PM), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/
2015/07/confidentiality-creep-and-death-penalty.
26 Latif, 28 F. Supp. at 1141.
27 Id.
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preparation for, in aid of or related to, terrorism or terrorist activities.”28 While
the nominator is advised against acting on “unfounded suspicions or
hunches,”29 the guidelines spell out that “irrefutable evidence or concrete facts
are not necessary.”30
In addition, the TSC includes an unknown number of additional individuals
in the database under a “secret exception to the reasonable suspicion
standard”—though the nature and extent of that exception is unknown—and
the government has asserted the state secrets defense to avoid its disclosure.31
It is difficult to imagine why such an exception would be needed, given the
existing breadth of the current criteria. For example, the reliance on
“suspicion” in both parts of the test means that even under the government’s
acknowledged criteria, it can include an individual on the list who is
“suspected of being a suspected terrorist” as well as anyone who is “suspected
of associating with people who are suspected of terrorism activity.”32
In addition to the nested layers of “suspicion” built into the existing
watchlisting criteria, the U.S. government also asserts a right to consider race,
religion, and speech protected by the First Amendment in determining whether
to include an individual in the database.33 According to the declaration of
Michael Steinbach, Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division,
“nominations must not be based solely on race, ethnicity, national origin,
religious affiliation, or activities protected by the First Amendment.”34 Left
open, however, is the possibility that race, religious belief, and political speech
could form part of the government’s basis for “reasonable suspicion.”
The TSC evaluates the individuals in the watchlisting database for
inclusion on either the no-fly list (individuals forbidden from flying within
U.S. airspace) or the “selectee” list (individuals selected for heightened

28

Id. (citation omitted).
NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., WATCHLISTING GUIDANCE 33, 34 (Mar. 2013), https://www.eff.org/
files/2014/07/24/2013-watchlist-guidance_1.pdf.34.
30 Id.
31 Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 923 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
32 Jeremy Scahill & Ryan Devereaux, Blacklisted: The Secret Government Rulebook for Labeling You a
Terrorist, INTERCEPT (July 23, 2014, 2:45 PM), https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/23/blacklisted/.
33 Declaration of Michael Steinbach at 6, Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. Or. 2014)
(No. 3:10-cv-00750-BR), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/latif-et-al-v-holder-et-al-declaration-michaelsteinbach (emphasis added).
34 Id.
29
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screening).35 The government has not released the criteria it uses to decide
which of the individuals in the database will be placed on either of these lists,
and individuals do not receive notice when they are placed on either list.36 The
government has previously asserted that the criteria for the selectee and no-fly
lists are “considerably more stringent” than the “reasonable suspicion”
standard used for initial placement in the database.37 Yet, in moving for
summary judgment against plaintiffs who asserted they were wrongly placed
on the list, the government re-asserted the “reasonable suspicion” standard
even for the no-fly list itself, arguing that “[a]s the Government has previously
explained and this Court has previously acknowledged, the standard for
inclusion on the No Fly List is ‘reasonable suspicion.’ The Government must
have a reasonable suspicion that one of the criteria for inclusion is met.”38
Given the breadth of the criteria used to add individuals to the database
and, potentially, to the no-fly list, it is not surprising that the no-fly list has
grown rapidly. Although the government has not released official statistics, it
has been reported that in the three years after 9/11, that list grew from sixteen
names to more than 20,000.39 By 2013, that number was said to have grown to
over 47,000, of whom 800 were American citizens.40 These numbers do not
include more than one million individuals who are allegedly on terrorist
watchlists and hence tend to experience more invasive screening but are not
altogether barred from flying.41

35 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ROLE OF THE NO FLY AND SELECTEE
LISTS IN SECURING COMMERCIAL AVIATION 9–13, app. E at 54 (July 2009), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/
Mgmt/OIGr_09-64_Jul09.pdf.
36 See, e.g., Third Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 6,
Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. Or. 2014) (No. 3:10-cv-00750-BR) [hereinafter Third Amended
Complaint] (describing how the defendants did not provide the plaintiffs with any post-deprivation notice and
how most Plaintiffs only discovered the error when trying to board a plane).
37 Id. at 7–9.
38 Defendants’ Cross-Motion, supra note 13, at 41 (citation omitted).
39 Sara Kehaulani Goo, Faulty ‘No-Fly’ System Detailed, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2004),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/10/09/faulty-no-fly-system-detailed/2ec7e66c-66884985-b038-e378ae0caca0/.
40 In First, Government Officially Tells ACLU Clients Their No Fly List Status, ACLU (Oct. 10, 2014),
https://www.aclu.org/news/first-government-officially-tells-aclu-clients-their-no-fly-list-status.
41 Peter Eisler, Terrorist Watch List Hits 1 Million, USA TODAY (Mar. 10, 2009, 11:06 PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-03-10-watchlist_N.htm.
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B. Secrecy in National Security Law and Policy
While the use of secrecy did not begin with the events of 9/11, the numbers
and types of activities hidden from the public eye multiplied since then. That is
the phenomenon of confidentiality creep to which we referred previously.42
This section gives some examples of implementations of secrecy in the legal
process and enforcement that can be traced back directly to the prevention and
punishment of terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11.
One prominent example of an (in this case literal) island of secrecy
involves the detention camp at Guantanamo Bay. Established in 2002 to house
and interrogate detainees viewed as particularly dangerous and usually
suspected of terrorism,43 the camp continues to exist to this day and to hold
numerous prisoners, including ones that President Obama promised to release
over two years ago.44 Guantanamo has been the subject of many controversies
over the years, and secrecy has played a key role in many of them. To name
just one example, British resident Omar Deghayes was wrongfully imprisoned
in Guantanamo for almost six years, in part due to a misidentification of a man
in a terrorist video in Chechnya as Deghayes, who had never been to that
country.45 Authorities refused to provide Guantanamo activist and human
rights attorney Stafford Smith with a copy of the tape, though he later obtained
one from the BBC and commented, “This was typical of the whole
Guantánamo experience. . . . [t]hey said they had evidence and they wouldn’t
let you see it. Then when you did, it was incorrect.”46 Deghayes was allegedly
tortured by his U.S. captors to the point of permanently losing sight in one
eye.47 He was also threatened with being handed over to the Libyan authorities
who had murdered his father, about which his lawyer Stafford Smith stated, “I
was appalled when my client later recounted these threats, made by Libyan
agents with US complicity, on his life. Yet all the details of the abuse that
take[] place in Guantanamo, Bagram and beyond remains classified and cannot

42

See supra Part I.
Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Fast Facts, CNN (Jan. 9, 2016, 5:51 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2013/09/09/world/guantanamo-bay-naval-station-fast-facts/.
44 See GTMO CLOCK, http://www.gtmoclock.com/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
45 Patrick Barkham, How I Fought to Survive Guantánamo, GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2010, 7:05 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/21/i-fought-to-survive-guantanamo.
46 Id.
47 See id.
43

MANTA_ROBERTSON GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

5/27/2016 10:13 AM

SECRET JURISDICTION

1323

be revealed without the censors’ permission.”48 Released in 2007, no charges
were ever filed against Omar Deghayes.49
This emphasis on secrecy has extended to other terrorism-related contexts
as well, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court,
which hears applications and grants orders for electronic surveillance.50 The
FISA court has been widely criticized both for the breadth of its powers and
for the secrecy under which it conducts its proceedings.51 Some have expressed
concerns that the use of secret evidence will become an increasingly significant
issue and will limit the role of defense lawyers and diminish defendants’
protections under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.52 While the FISA court
remained under many Americans’ radars for years, this dramatically changed
with the disclosures by Edward Snowden, who revealed that the court had
ordered Verizon to hand over daily the phone records of millions of Americans
to the NSA.53 The government has increasingly shrouded its actions in a veil of
secrecy while individual citizens’ privacy has been reduced, in part through the
use of new technological means.54 One scholar believes that the Obama
Administration has made progress in a number of areas related to secrecy, but
that other parts have significantly fallen short: “Although the administration

48 Clive Stafford Smith, From Brighton to Camp Delta: Mis-Identification Leads to Three Years in
Guantánamo Bay, CAGE PRISONERS (Dec. 7, 2006), http://old.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=15199.
49 Former Detainee Talks of Desperation in Guantanamo Bay, NPR (May 5, 2013, 12:57 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2013/05/05/181215131/former-detainee-talks-of-desperation-in-guantanamo-bay.
50 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2012).
51 See, e.g., Dia Kayyali, What You Need to Know About the FISA Court—And How It Needs to Change,
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/08/what-you-need-know-aboutfisa-court-and-how-it-needs-change.
52 Ellen Yaroshefsky, Secret Evidence Is Slowly Eroding the Adversary System: CIPA and FISA in the
Courts, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1084 (2006).
53 Alex Fitzpatrick, NSA Secretly Collecting Millions of Verizon Subscribers’ Records, MASHABLE (June
5, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/06/05/verizon-nsa-phone-records/ (“The NSA was granted the authority to
collect three months’ worth of Verizon subscribers’ data beginning April 25 and ending July 19 by the secret
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.”); Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, The 10 Biggest Revelations From
Edward Snowden’s Leaks, MASHABLE (June 5, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/06/05/edward-snowdenrevelations/ (stating that the “treasure trove of NSA documents” released came from Edward Snowden); Glenn
Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013,
6:05 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order.
54 Irina Manta, Hello and Musings on Rhetoric and Labeling in the Post-Snowden Era (Part 1),
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Aug. 4, 2013), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/08/hello-and-musingson-rhetoric-and-labeling-in-the-post-snowden-era-part-1.html.
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appears to have used secret law less frequently than its predecessors, we will
not be able to determine that for a while, given all of the, well, secrecy.”55
C. How Secrecy Prevents Effective Redress
When national security’s “confidentiality creep” collides with the broad
and loosely defined watchlisting policies, individuals find that they have little
recourse to challenge their placement on the no-fly list. This difficulty means
that simple errors can go undetected for years, prohibiting individuals from
flying even when the U.S. government did not intend to bar them from doing
so. In 2005, for example, Stanford doctoral student Rahinah Ibrahim was
detained at the San Francisco International Airport when she sought to board a
flight to give a scholarly presentation in Hawaii.56 Wheel-chair bound and
denied medication after surgery, she was let go and flew back to her home
country of Malaysia, but after suing, she was denied permission to take a return
flight for her own trial.57 Government officials allegedly made false statements
about her case to hide the fact that Ibrahim was placed on the no-fly list due to
a simple paperwork error—an FBI agent had checked the wrong box on a
form, which resulted in years of litigation and $3.8 million of attorney time.58
Meanwhile, even after years of litigation and eventual removal from the no-fly
list, a different individual named Jamal Tarhuni never found out why he was
placed on it after he delivered medical supplies in Libya on behalf of Oregonbased relief organization Medical Teams International.59
Other errors have involved children, such as when JetBlue removed a
toddler from a flight because the airline believed that she was on the no-fly list
at the tender age of eighteen months, an incident which the airline blamed on a
computer error.60 The late Senator Ted Kennedy ended up on the list as well

55 Jason Ross Arnold, Has Obama Delivered the ‘Most Transparent’ Administration in History?, WASH.
POST: MONKEY CAGE (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/16/
has-obama-delivered-the-most-transparent-administration-in-history/.
56 David Kravets, How Obama Officials Cried ‘Terrorism’ to Cover Up a Paperwork Error, WIRED
(Feb. 11, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/02/no-fly-coverup/. For a discussion of Rahinah
Ibrahim’s legal case, see infra Part III.B.2.
57 Kravets, supra note 56.
58 Id.
59 Editorial, No-Fly List Victory Stemmed from Tigard Man’s Resolve Despite Government Roadblocks:
Editorial, OREGONIAN (Feb. 26, 2015, 4:46 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2015/02/nofly_list_victory_stemmed_fr.html; see also Tarhuni v. Holder, 8 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1262, 1264 (2014).
60 Mary Forgione, JetBlue Blames ‘Computer Glitch’ for Removing Toddler from Flight, L.A. TIMES
(May 11, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/11/news/la-trb-jetblue-no-fly-20120511.
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because his name resembled the alias of a terrorist.61 Others were placed on the
list despite the direct risks to their careers, such as was the case for commercial
pilot, veteran, and convert to Islam Erich Scherfen.62 Singer and fellow convert
Cat Stevens was mistakenly denied boarding because his adopted new name
Yusuf Islam led to a mix-up with the name on the list Youssouf Islam.63
Even more troubling than the difficulty in correcting simple clerical errors,
however, is the difficulty individuals face in trying to clear their names when it
appears that their presence on the list is due to a policy choice rather a mere
clerical error. Originally, the government refused even to give official
confirmation that an individual was on the list—much less a reason for their
inclusion. Airline employees, however, occasionally suggested that religious or
political views could play a role in boarding decisions.64 Walter Murphy, an
emeritus professor at Princeton University at the time, claimed that upon being
denied boarding, an airline employee asked if he had been in any peace
marches because that can lead to flight bans.65 Murphy replied that he had not
done so but had spoken critically about then-President George W. Bush on the
topic of constitutional violations, to which the airline employee retorted,
“That’ll do it.”66 And, as mentioned above, one of the plaintiffs in Latif v.
Holder has reason to believe that his views played a role in his placement on
the no-fly list.67
The United States has a longer history of refusing the right to travel to
individuals with views perceived as contrary to the national interest, including
at one point through the mechanism of refusing to issue passports to them

61 Rachel L. Swarns, Senator? Terrorist? A Watch List Stops Kennedy at Airport, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20,
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/20/us/senator-terrorist-a-watch-list-stops-kennedy-at-airport.html.
62 See Jeanne Meserve, Name on Government Watch List Threatens Pilot’s Career, CNN (Aug. 22, 2008,
10:07 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/08/22/pilot.watch.list/.
63 Sally B. Donnelly, You Say Yusuf, I Say Youssouf. . . , TIME (Sept. 25, 2004), http://content.time.com/
time/nation/article/0,8599,702062,00.html. As a separate matter, however, accusations have been made that
Cat Stevens has provided funding to Hamas. See Israel Deports Former Pop Star Cat Stevens, ABC NEWS
(July 13, 2000), http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=83179. But see Cat Stevens ‘In the Dark’ over
No-Fly List, ABC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2004), http://abcnews.go.com/2020/News/story?id=139607 (explaining that
Cat Stevens denies knowing that money he gave for charities ended up in the hands of Hamas).
64 See Don Melvin & Diana Magnay, UK Muslims with Disneyland Plans: We Were Barred from a
Plane Due to Religion, CNN (Dec. 24, 2015, 6:08 A.M.), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/23/europe/britishmuslims-denied-boarding-to-la/.
65 Naomi Wolf, Fascist America, in 10 Easy Steps, GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2007, 3:02 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/apr/24/usa.comment.
66 Id.
67 See supra Part I.
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altogether.68 Whether the airline employee in Murphy’s case was correct or
not, it shows (1) that people in the airline industry do believe that political
activity could lead to placement on the list, (2) the government refuses to say
that this conclusion is incorrect, and (3) as mentioned, the government
specifically reserves the right to use this kind of activity as part of its
determinations. Hence, there is a well-founded perception that political activity
can at least contribute to placement on the list, and even if it is incorrect, this
perception is likely to have a chilling effect on core political speech and other
activities.69
Over the years, a number of lawsuits were mounted to respond to the
restrictions imposed on the many people on the no-fly list.70 The most highprofile of these cases and most successful thus far has been the ACLU’s
litigation in Latif v. Holder.71 The ACLU identified thirteen plaintiffs—all U.S.
citizens, including four veterans of the U.S. armed forces—to present the
“strongest possible challenge to the government’s listing policy.”72 None of the
plaintiffs were officially informed of their status on the list prior to filing the
lawsuit; instead, they learned of their potential placement on the list only when
they were denied boarding at the airport.73

68

See generally KAHN, supra note 6, at 154–55.
See Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment
Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 745–46 (2008) (noting the chilling effects in this
type of context).
70 See, e.g., Mokdad v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 807, 815 (6th Cir. 2015) (“We reverse the judgment of the
district court dismissing Mokdad’s challenge to his alleged placement on the No Fly List by TSC and remand
for further proceedings in the district court.”); Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 538 F.3d 1250, 1254, 1256
n.9 (9th Cir. 2008) (allowing a plaintiff to challenge placement on the no-fly list). Many of these cases are still
pending. See Fikre v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. 3:13-cv-00899-BR, 2015 WL 6756121, at *10 (D. Or.
Nov. 4, 2015) (“Plaintiff’s allegations provide a sufficient Factual basis at this early stage of the proceedings to
state a procedural due-process claim based on Plaintiff’s right to international travel and freedom from false
government stigmatization.”); Mohamed v. Holder, No. 1:11-cv-50 (AJT/MSN), 2015 WL 4394958, at *13–
14 (E.D. Va. July 16, 2015) (explaining that because the Department of Homeland Security had adopted new
redress and review procedures after the Latif v. Holder decision, a plaintiff challenging his placement on the
list should “state whether at this point he wishes to request review of his status under the revised DHS TRIP,
and if so, whether this action should be stayed pending the completion of that process”); Beydoun v. Holder,
No. 14-cv-13812, 2015 WL 631948, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2015) (staying a plaintiff’s challenge to the nofly list to wait for the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Mokdad).
71 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. Or. 2014).
72 See Cassandra Burke Robertson & Irina D. Manta, Challenging the No-Fly List: The Status of the
Litigation After Five Years, ABA SEC. OF LITIG.: C.R. (Aug. 17, 2015), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/
committees/civil/articles.html.
73 Third Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at 4.
69

MANTA_ROBERTSON GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

5/27/2016 10:13 AM

SECRET JURISDICTION

1327

None of the plaintiffs were formally accused of committing any crime prior
to their placement on the list. One of the plaintiffs—former Air Force officer
Steven Washburn—was allegedly interviewed by FBI agents who told him that
they had “no concern” about him, and suggested that he “get around the no-fly
list by flying to Mexico” and then driving into the United States.74 Because
none of the plaintiffs were wanted by law enforcement—and recognizing that
placement on the no-fly list has no connection to other security restrictions,
and would not preclude individuals on the list from successfully passing an
ordinary background check for security-sensitive positions75—the plaintiffs
characterized the government’s position as deeming them “too dangerous to
fly, but too harmless to arrest.”76
The individual stories alleged by the plaintiffs in this case illustrate the
hardships that individuals on the no-fly list experience, and they are worth
mentioning as the case forms a key part of the analysis in the next Part77:
– Ayman Latif: A U.S. Marine Corps veteran with a wife and children, Latif
was disallowed from returning to the United States after living in Egypt with
his family for a year and a half. As a result, his veteran disability benefits were
reduced. He eventually received a one-time permission to fly back to the
United States but then was prohibited from flying again after that, which
interfered with his desire to conduct studies and fulfill religious obligations in
Saudi Arabia.78
– Mohamed Sheikh Abdirahm Kariye: Kariye lived in Oregon with his wife
and children and was prevented from boarding flights out of the United States,
preventing him from visiting his daughter in Dubai or traveling to Saudi
Arabia for religious pilgrimages.79
– Raymond Earl Knaeble IV: Knaeble is a U.S. Army veteran who worked
in Kuwait and then married his Colombian wife in Bogota, after which he was
disallowed from flying to the United States. Among the later problems he

74

Solomon & Ross, supra note 15.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text (explaining that when individuals in the TDSB underwent
background checks to purchase firearms, they were able to pass 90% of the time).
76 Latif, et al. v. Holder, et al.—ACLU Challenge To Government No Fly List, ACLU, https://www.aclu.
org/cases/latif-et-al-v-holder-et-al-aclu-challenge-government-no-fly-list (last updated Aug. 10, 2015).
77 For the district court’s summary of these cases, see Latif, v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1134, 1143–46
(D. Or. 2014).
78 Id. at 1143–44.
79 Id. at 1144.
75
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experienced, Knaeble’s employer rescinded an offer for a position in Qatar
because Knaeble was unable to fly to a required medical examination in the
U.S.80
– Faisal Nabin Kashem: Kashem enrolled in a language and Islam study
program in Saudi Arabia and was subsequently prevented to return to the
United States from vacation; he turned down a one-time waiver to return
because officials refused to confirm that he would be able to go to back to
Saudi Arabia to finish his studies.81
– Elias Mustafa Mohamed: Like Kashem, Mohamed enrolled in studies in
Saudi Arabia, was denied return, and refused a one-time waiver due to
uncertainty over being able to complete his studies.82
– Steven William Washburn: A U.S. Air Force veteran, Washburn was
prohibited from flying from Ireland to Boston in 2010, though he eventually
returned to the U.S. via a complicated route and a pedestrian border crossing
from Mexico. Two years later, an FBI agent told him that he would help to
remove Washburn’s name from the no-fly list if Washburn agreed to speak to
the FBI. Washburn was separated from his wife for years because she was in
Ireland and could not obtain a visa to the U.S. while he was prevented from
flying to go see her.83
– Nagib Ali Ghaleb: Ghaleb was unable to return to the United States after
travel to Yemen via Frankfurt, Germany. The FBI offered him a deal if he
agreed to rat out the “bad guys” in Yemen and San Francisco, and the agency
allegedly threatened him with arrest. Ghaleb eventually returned on a one-time
waiver but could not go visit his relatives in Yemen any more.84
– Abdullatif Muthanna: Muthanna was prevented from flying to the U.S.
after visiting his wife and children in Yemen, accepted a one-time waiver, and
was “not allowed to board flights on four separate occasions” until February
2013 when he finally boarded a flight to Dubai to see his family. He was
repeatedly denied plane boarding and was prevented from boarding a ship
upon the recommendation of U.S. Customs and Border Protection.85

80
81
82
83
84
85

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1144–45.
Id. at 1145.
Id.
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– Mashaal Rana: Rana began pursuing Islamic studies in Pakistan in 2009,
and the following year she was unable to board a flight to the U.S. In 2012, she
tried to fly to the U.S. again to receive pregnancy-related medical care, but
despite initially receiving clearance to fly, this was withdrawn five hours
before her flight. She had turned down the one-time waiver she was offered in
2010 because of fear that she would be unable to return to Pakistan where her
husband lives.86
– Ibraheim Y. Mashal: A U.S. Marine Corps veteran, Mashal was not
allowed to board a flight in the U.S. and was offered removal from the no-fly
list as well as compensation if he agreed to become an FBI informant. When he
requested the presence of an attorney, the FBI agents terminated the meeting.
Mashal has lost numerous business opportunities and was prevented from
attending personally meaningful events such as weddings and funerals due to
his inability to fly.87
– Salah Ali Ahmed: Ahmed has been repeatedly prevented from traveling
from the U.S. to Yemen, including when his brother died and when he wanted
to visit family or attend to property matters.88
– Amir Meshal: Meshal was prohibited from taking a flight from California
to New Jersey in 2009 and was offered removal from the no-fly list in
exchange for serving as a government informant. He remained unable to visit
family in Egypt due to his placement on the list.89
– Stephen Durga Persaud: Persaud was prevented from boarding a flight
from St. Thomas to Miami, and an FBI agent told him that he would have to
talk to the agency if he wanted off the no-fly list. Persaud experienced
numerous hassles as a result of his placement on the list and cannot fly to
Saudi Arabia to fulfill religious obligations.90
The Department of Justice confirmed in a letter on October 10, 2014 that
Latif, Mohamed, Ghaleb, Muthanna, Mashal, Ahmed, and Rana were no
longer on the no-fly list.91 The ACLU commented that the letter

86

Id. at 1145–46.
Id. at 1146.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Letter from Amy Powell, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Hina Shamsi, Am. Civil Liberties Union Found.
(Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/no_fly_letter.pdf.
87
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also makes clear to the six other clients in the case that they’re still
banned from flying. And while that may not seem like good news,
it’s the first time the government has confirmed—albeit through
negative implication rather than a direct confirmation—that people
are on the No Fly List.92

As of March 2016, Kashem, Karieye, Knaeble, Meshal, Persaud, and
Washburn remained on the list.93 Confirmation of their status on the no-fly list
represented a major litigation victory for the plaintiffs; without that ruling, they
could not have pursued their challenge.94 Disclosure of some of the plaintiffs’
continued presence on the list thus paves the way for the court to address the
more fundamental question: On what basis may the government restrict a
citizen’s right to fly, and how should courts review claims by those who allege
they were wrongfully restricted?
III. THE NO-FLY LIST AND DUE PROCESS
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that the
government may not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.95 Courts have developed two largely separate frameworks
for analyzing whether the constitutional due process requirement is met. The
first framework, procedural due process, “asks whether the government has
followed the proper procedures when it takes away life, liberty or property,”96
and typically requires notice and a hearing before such deprivation can occur.97
The doctrine of substantive due process is much less developed than

92 Noa Yachot, A Great Day for Seven Americans Formerly on the No Fly List, ACLU (Oct. 11, 2014,
11:19 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/great-day-seven-americans-formerly-no-fly-list.
93 Latif v. Lynch, 3:10-cv-00750-BR, 2016 WL 1239925, at *5 (D. Or. Mar. 28, 2016).
94 Id.
95 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
96 Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501 (1999); see also Nathan
S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1807
(2012) (“Fundamentally, [due process] was about securing the rule of law. It ensured that the executive would
not be able unilaterally to deprive persons within the nation of their rights of life, liberty, or property except as
provided by common law or statute and as adjudicated by independent judicial bodies, and that legislatures
would not be able to step beyond their properly legislative roles of enacting general rules for governance of
future behavior.”).
97 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (“Many controversies have
raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a
minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”).
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procedural due process, but it “looks to whether there is a sufficient substantive
justification, a good enough reason for such a deprivation.”98
A. Procedural Due Process
When a court evaluates a procedural due process claim in the first instance,
it conducts what is in essence a cost–benefit analysis, weighing the risk that the
plaintiff will be erroneously deprived of liberty against the cost of providing
additional procedures to safeguard against such error.99 In the leading case of
Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court listed the factors that the court should
take into account in conducting that analysis.100 First, the court must consider
the plaintiff’s “private interest that will be affected by the official action.”101
Second, the court must examine “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.”102 Finally, the court must
weigh “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.”103 In short, when plaintiffs seek additional
procedural protections against loss of liberty or property, the court must
evaluate whether the benefits gained from the proposed procedures would
outweigh the administrative burden and costs of administering them.
The Supreme Court’s prior cases concerning travel raise difficult issues that
the courts grappling with these cases must address. Specifically, how should
national security—and its concomitant need for secrecy—be integrated into the
procedural due process analysis? The procedural due process analysis, after all,
necessarily relies on predictions of risk and estimates of future harm—it
requires the judge to make a reasonable estimate of the costs and benefits for
the requested procedural protections. When the underlying evidence is kept
secret from the petitioners and even from the judge, then the procedural due
process analysis transforms from an estimate to a mere guess.104

98

Chemerinsky, supra note 96.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See generally Gary Lawson, Katharine Ferguson &
Guillermo A. Montero, “Oh Lord, Please Don’t Let Me Be Misunderstood!”: Rediscovering the Mathews v.
Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2005).
100 424 U.S. at 335.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 See infra Part III.A.1.
99
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1. Procedural Due Process in Cases Touching on National Security
Some have argued that the Mathews test is largely unhelpful in the national
security context, given the overwhelming strength of the issues on both sides—
liberty on the one hand, and national security on the other.105 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court reiterated the importance of a rigorous procedural due process
analysis even in the midst of the war on terror when it applied the Mathews
balancing test in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a suit challenging a citizen’s
classification as an enemy combatant.106 The Court acknowledged the strong
interests on both sides of the Mathews equation but concluded that procedural
due process required that a citizen have the right “to challenge meaningfully
the Government’s case and to be heard by an impartial adjudicator.”107 To
protect the detainee’s ability to challenge his detention, the Court held that the
government’s proposed standard (requiring only “some evidence” to support
indefinite detention) was insufficient to meet the demands of due process.108
The Court did not, however, specify what such proceedings would look like—
or how the detainees would develop the evidentiary record to challenge their
detention.109
The difficulty in applying the procedural due process analysis is
compounded when secrecy obligations obstruct the development of a full
evidentiary record. Because the procedural due process analysis turns on the
relative weight of each of the three factors, it is difficult for a court to conduct
105 Tung Yin, Procedural Due Process to Determine “Enemy Combatant” Status in the War on
Terrorism, 73 TENN. L. REV. 351, 400 (2006) (“The Mathews balancing test is especially unsuitable for use in
the war on terrorism, since the clash of individual and national security interests allows the judicial
decisionmaker to reach any plausible outcome.”).
106 542 U.S. 507, 532–33 (2004).
107 Id. at 529, 535.
108 Id. at 537 (“Because we conclude that due process demands some system for a citizen-detainee to
refute his classification, the proposed ‘some evidence’ standard is inadequate. Any process in which the
Executive’s factual assertions go wholly unchallenged or are simply presumed correct without any opportunity
for the alleged combatant to demonstrate otherwise falls constitutionally short.”).
109 See id. at 538–39 (anticipating that district courts would engage in “a factfinding process that is both
prudent and incremental. . . . pay[ing] proper heed both to the matters of national security that might arise in an
individual case and to the constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties that remain vibrant even in
times of security concerns”). In the years after Hamdi, the D.C. Circuit has generally applied a “preponderance
of the evidence” standard to judge enemy-combatant detention, and other courts have developed evidentiary
rules and procedures. See Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“We have said that this Hamdi
approach ‘mirrors’ the preponderance standard.”); Jasmeet K. Ahuja & Andrew Tutt, Evidentiary Rules
Governing Guantánamo Habeas Petitions: Their Effects and Consequences, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 185,
187 (2012) (“[A]s the government and detainees began to appeal habeas decisions on the basis of adverse
evidentiary rulings, the Court of Appeals announced binding evidentiary rules limiting the district courts’
discretion to admit, exclude, weigh, and consider evidence as the district courts saw fit.”).
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the analysis when the government asserts a right to secrecy covering the very
procedures challenged by the plaintiffs. The right that the government seeks to
protect—the “government’s interest” underlying prong three—is a right of
confidentiality and nondisclosure. But if those procedures are unknown, then
the court will not be able to effectively assess the plaintiff’s risk of erroneous
deprivation of liberty.
The district court’s 2014 opinion in Latif v. Holder demonstrated this
difficulty when it struggled with the due process analysis because so many of
the factors underlying the cost–benefit equation were unknown and ill-defined.
The easiest factor for the court to delineate was the plaintiffs’ private
interest.110 The court identified two relevant interests that were abridged by
placement on the no-fly list: an interest in exercising a right to travel
internationally and an interest in avoiding the stigma of being marked as a
suspected terrorist.111 The risk of erroneous deprivation was much more
difficult to assess—the court cited several cases where individuals had been
mistakenly placed on the no-fly list, and it concluded that such erroneous
deprivation was likely to occur under the then-current no-fly procedure where
the government refused to reveal whether individuals were on the list or to
offer any reasons for their inclusion on the list.112 The government’s interest in
“combating terrorism and protecting classified information” weighed heavily
in the government’s favor—the court characterized this interest as “particularly
compelling,”113 but ultimately the court was persuaded that additional
procedural protections would not necessarily “jeopardiz[e] the government’s
interest in national security.”114 The Latif court concluded that it had enough
information to determine that existing procedures were constitutionally
deficient, and it ordered defendants to provide plaintiffs, at a minimum, with
notice of their status on the no-fly list and an unclassified explanation of the
reason for their placement on the list.115
In a later proceeding in the case (now styled Latif v. Lynch) the court
reiterated the interests at stake in the Mathews analysis.116 This time the court
weighed those interests in light of the revised procedures that the government

110
111
112
113
114
115
116

28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1149–50 (D. Or. 2014).
Id. at 1150–51.
Id. at 1152–53.
Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1160–62.
Id. at 1161–63.
3:10-cv-00750-BR, 2016 WL 1239925, at *7–9 (D. Or. Mar. 28, 2016).
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had adopted in the wake of the first opinion, and the court concluded that, at
least in the abstract, those procedures could protect the plaintiffs’ due process
interests and were thus “facially adequate.”117 The question of whether the
actual implementation of those procedures in fact complied with the plaintiffs’
due process rights was left unresolved, to await further briefing.118 The court
concluded that if the government defendants provided the plaintiffs enough
information to allow them to “respond meaningfully” in challenging their
placement on the no-fly list, then the constitutional safeguards would be
met.119 However, because the record before the court neither disclosed what
information had been withheld from the plaintiffs nor “provide[d] justification
for withholding that information,” the court could not rule that the revised
procedures met the constitutional standard.120 The court required the
government defendants to “include with the administrative record submitted to
the appropriate court an affidavit or declaration from a competent witness” that
“identifies for the court the information that was withheld, provides
justification for withholding that information, and explains why Defendants
could not make additional disclosures.”121 This ruling is unlikely to settle the
matter, however, as the government defendants have continuously objected
that such disclosures would harm national security interests.
Because the first Latif court determined that additional procedures could be
granted without sacrificing the government’s interest, it did not need to reach
the more difficult question: how much process is due? The question was also
left unresolved after the second opinion, as the court found the record to be
insufficiently developed to determine whether the implementation of the new
procedures was sufficient to protect the plaintiffs’ due process rights.
Similarly, the issue of “how much process is due” is the same question that
the Supreme Court had earlier kept open in Hamdi, when the Court left lower
courts to determine how the principles of due process should be applied to
individuals detained as potential enemy combatants.122 In both cases, the
government has made a determination that individuals pose certain security
risks—in the detention cases, the risk is a more immediate one, and in the
aviation security context, it may be a lesser or more attenuated one—and in
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id. at *14.
Id. at *14–15.
Id.
Id. at *15–16.
Id. at *19.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538–39 (2004).
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both cases, classified intelligence information is essential to making that
determination. As courts have grappled with the detention cases, their
procedures have converged with ordinary criminal process to a significant
degree.123 Perhaps this is not surprising; after all, detention and criminal
confinement share a common restriction of liberty.124
In the aviation security context, courts have yet to define the parameters of
due process. Now that the government has provided notice to the plaintiffs still
on the list and has given a minimal (and concededly incomplete) answer as to
why each of the remaining plaintiffs is still on the list, that question is both
paramount and difficult to answer. It was easy enough for the court to decide
that the former procedure was insufficient—but how much is enough, and do
the government’s incremental additions now meet that requirement?
2. Measuring Risks by a Secret Yardstick
In cases touching on national security issues—including litigation
challenging the no-fly procedures—the government’s asserted interest in
secrecy prevents the court from fully assessing either the risk of erroneous
deprivation or the scope of the potential threat to national security. The revised
no-fly procedures required by the Latif court, which required the government
to confirm or deny that a given individual is on the list and to offer a minimal
reason for placement on the list, should reduce the risk of complete misidentification or confusion regarding similar names.125 But what about the
harder case—where the government indeed intends to include an individual on
the list due to suspicions about his or her ties to terrorism, but those suspicions
are unfounded, and thus fail to meet even the low standard of “reasonable
suspicion”? Unfortunately, there is no way for the court to analyze the
reasonableness of the government’s suspicions—and therefore evaluate the
risk of erroneous deprivation—unless the judge knows the full range of

123 See Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military
Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1081 (2008) (explaining that the military and criminal justice
systems “have converged on procedural and especially substantive criteria for detention”).
124 Id. (“The traditional criminal model, with its demanding substantive and procedural requirements, is
the most legitimate institution for long-term incapacitation. But it has difficulty achieving preventive
incapacitation. Traditional military detention, by contrast, combines associational detention criteria with
procedural flexibility to make it relatively easy to incapacitate.”).
125 See supra Part II.C.
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evidence underlying the government’s decision, and not just the “general
nature of the Government’s concerns.”126
Likewise, the court cannot estimate the potential risk to national security
interests (including the exposure of surveillance efforts and the potential that
investigative targets will be apprised of the government’s interest) if it lacks
key information about those efforts. Are the government’s efforts focused
narrowly on high-risk individuals, more broadly on members of ethnic and
religious subgroups, or even, at the most extreme, on the public generally?127
The risk of disclosing the government’s interest in a single high-risk
identifiable individual may be more of a threat to national security than
disclosing the government’s interest in investigating larger groups of people
with few if any known connections to terrorism. And, as the plaintiffs point
out, the court cannot assess legal challenges to governmental surveillance
programs if the government refuses to provide information about the nature
and scope of those surveillance efforts.128

126 Defendant’s Consolidated Memorandum, supra note 3, at 34 & n.18; see also Soumya Panda, Note,
The Procedural Due Process Requirements for No-Fly Lists, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 121, 154 (2005) (“Because the
TSA does not publish its procedures or selection criteria for the lists, the court cannot demonstrate that the
agency has a reasonable basis for its actions.”).
127 This challenge is further compounded by cognitive biases and heuristics that may systematically
overestimate the risk of harm from terrorism. See Avidan Y. Cover, Presumed Imminence: Judicial Risk
Assessment in the Post-9/11 World, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1415, 1468–69 (2014) (explaining “how perceptions
of risk, influenced by psychological, social, and cultural biases, affect judges’ decisions about terrorism”);
Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions, and the Rule of
Law, 96 IOWA L. REV. 195, 198–99 (2010) (explaining how “[p]resentist bias” can lead national security
decisionmakers to adopt policies that favor “short-term fixes like mass detentions or curbs on free speech with
troubling long-term consequences,” and how “hindsight bias” leads juries and judges to “overestimate
officials’ ability to correctly decide whom to arrest, detain, or interrogate”).
128 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment at 4, Latif v. Lynch, 3:10-cv-00750-BR, 2016 WL 1239925 (D. Or. Mar. 28, 2016) [hereinafter
Memorandum of Points] (“It is undisputed that the letters did not confirm or deny whether any surveillance
techniques were used to procure information that formed a basis for including the Plaintiffs on the No Fly List,
including techniques that could render the use of such evidence unlawful.”); see also Patrick Toomey & Brett
Max Kaufman, The Notice Paradox: Secret Surveillance, Criminal Defendants, & the Right to Notice,
54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 843, 862 (2014) (“[M]ere notice that the government had used a wiretap in its
investigation would not tell a defendant whether the government had relied on Title III, FISA, or some other
legal authority. And, therefore, notice of the bare fact of the wiretap would not permit the defendant to
effectively challenge either the validity of the statute itself or the government’s compliance with the applicable
statutory procedures.”).
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Courts have acknowledged that the use of secret evidence makes the
Mathews balancing test difficult to apply. In a pre-9/11129 immigration case,
for example, the Ninth Circuit examined whether undisclosed classified
information could be used in proceedings seeking to deport individuals who
were members of a political party associated with terrorist ideology—even
though there was no evidence that the individuals themselves presented a risk
to national security.130 In that case, the court concluded that “[b]ecause of the
danger of injustice when decisions lack the procedural safeguards that form the
core of constitutional due process, the Mathews balancing suggests that use of
undisclosed information in adjudications should be presumptively
unconstitutional” in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.131
In another pre-9/11 immigration case, the D.C. Circuit similarly examined
whether a permanent resident could be excluded from the United States on the
basis of secret evidence.132 Rafeedie, the petitioner, had traveled to Syria and
subsequently sought to re-enter the United States.133 The INS, however,
alleged that his purpose in traveling to Syria had been “nefarious” and
therefore supported his exclusion from the United States.134 The government
did not provide evidence of its assertion, resting instead on an unproven
allegation.135 The court explained that the petitioner could prevail under the
government’s proposed standard only “if he can rebut the undisclosed evidence
against him, i.e., prove that he is not a terrorist regardless of what might be
implied by the Government’s confidential information.”136 The court noted that
“[i]t is difficult to imagine how even someone innocent of all wrongdoing
could meet such a burden.”137 The court concluded that the petitioner was
entitled to due process in the proceeding determining whether or not he had a
right to return:
The Government cannot assert as an argument against procedural
safeguards that the accused is guilty as charged. The whole point of
due process is that the facts must be determined according to certain
129 Professor Avidan Cover has pointed to a “post-9/11 heuristic,” in which cases decided prior to the
events of September 11, 2001, weigh the risk of terrorism less heavily than cases decided post 9/11. See Cover,
supra note 127, at 1419–20.
130 Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1071 (9th Cir. 1995).
131 Id. at 1070.
132 Rafeedie v. Immigration & Naturalization Servs., 880 F.2d 506, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
133 Id. at 508–09.
134 Id. at 520.
135 Id. at 523.
136 Id. at 516.
137 Id.
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procedures that have been agreed upon in advance for reasons of
enduring policy divorced from the exigencies of any particular
case.138

The Ninth Circuit returned to this issue in Al Haramain Islamic Foundation,
Inc. v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, a post-9/11 lawsuit filed by a
nonprofit organization challenging a decision by U.S. government that
designated it a terrorist organization and froze its funds.139 This time, the court
concluded that even if the use of such secret information was presumptively
unconstitutional, “the use of classified information in the fight against
terrorism, during a presidentially declared ‘national emergency,’ qualifie[d] as
sufficiently ‘extraordinary’ to overcome the presumption.”140 Nonetheless, the
court pointed out that the use of secret evidence increased the risk of error:
“Without disclosure of classified information, the designated entity cannot
possibly know how to respond to OFAC’s concerns. Without knowledge of a
charge, even simple factual errors may go uncorrected despite potentially easy,
ready, and persuasive explanations.”141 Without a way to gauge the scope and
extent of those risks, there is no way to evaluate the costs and benefits of
requiring additional procedural protections.
3. Can Secret Evidence Be Judicially Managed?
In theory, careful judicial management and in camera review of classified
evidence could offer some room for compromise. Even as it accepted that the
post-9/11 fight against terrorism constituted an “extraordinary” circumstance
warranting the use of secret information, the Ninth Circuit in Al Haramain
Islamic Foundation nevertheless concluded that the Mathews test required
examination of potential additional “safeguards” to offset the use of secret
information.142 It held that the district court should explore possibilities such as
providing an “unclassified summary” of the evidence against the petitioner or
allowing petitioner’s counsel “who has the appropriate security clearance” to
view the evidence.143
Other courts and scholars have similarly suggested that courts could enact
procedures that would protect sensitive information from broader disclosure
138
139
140
141
142
143

Id. at 523–24.
686 F.3d 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 982.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 983.
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while still ensuring that individuals have the opportunity to challenge the
restriction of their liberty.144 This idea, after all, was the impetus behind the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, which created a
specialized court to hear requests for surveillance warrants.145 Although the
FISA court’s mandate is limited, the basic concept of judicial management for
classified or sensitive information has been applied more broadly; for example,
at an earlier stage in the Latif litigation, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the
district court might use the Classified Information Procedures Act to handle
“sensitive intelligence information” in discovery.146
Although the availability and utility of such procedures should certainly be
included in the Mathews weighing, neither the government nor individuals
subject to government restrictions have found them to eliminate the essential
collision of secrecy and due process. In the Latif litigation, the government
defendants have argued that the use of such procedures may violate
constitutional protections, stating that “[u]nder well-established separation of
powers principles, decisions about who may access or use classified
information and under what circumstances are not subject to judicial
review.”147 The defendants went on to argue that, even if such procedures
could be judicially imposed, they would create a significant enough national
security threat that a Mathews analysis should not require their use.148 The
defendants characterized even the procedures of the Classified Information
Procedures Act as only “purportedly secure,” and suggested that limiting
access to attorneys with proper security clearances would not protect against
this perceived threat.149 Plaintiffs in the Latif case, on the other hand, expressed
support for the use of sealed evidence, protective orders, and an opportunity
144 See, e.g., Matthew R. Hall, Procedural Due Process Meets National Security: The Problem of
Classified Evidence in Immigration Proceedings, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 515 (2002) (proposing that
immigration judges take on a more inquisitorial role when classified evidence is used in an immigration
proceeding); Note, Secret Evidence in the War on Terror, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1962, 1982 (2005)
(recommending reforms to the military tribunal process). But see Yaroshefsky, supra note 52, at 1064 (arguing
that, at least when used in criminal prosecutions, such procedures fail to protect defendants’ constitutional
right to mount a defense).
145 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2012).
146 Latif v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We also leave to the sound judgment of the
district court how to handle discovery of what may be sensitive intelligence information.” (citing Classified
Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1–16)).
147 Defendants’ Cross-Motion, supra note 13, at 43 (first citing CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 180 (1985);
then citing Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529–30 (1988); and then citing Dorfmont v. Brown, 913
F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1990)).
148 Id. at 43–45.
149 Id. at 45.
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for “cleared counsel” to view classified evidence, referring to these procedures
as “robust . . . trusted and proven to protect national security.”150 Nonetheless,
the plaintiffs also expressed concern that if procedures such as “unclassified
summaries” are used, the defendants must still disclose enough information to
give each of the plaintiffs “substantially the same ability to make his defense as
would disclosure of the specific classified information.”151 Thus, the essential
conflict remains: the government defendants object to disclosing the full range
of evidence used to place the plaintiffs on the no-fly list, and the plaintiffs
argue that they cannot defend against this decision without knowing the scope
of the evidence against them.152 Any other procedure, no matter how robust,
cannot satisfy both sides—either the information is turned over, or it is not.
B. Substantive Due Process
In addition to procedural protections, substantive due process also plays an
important role in protecting individual liberty—especially when the procedural
protections are difficult to weigh on their own. That is, it may matter less what
procedures are granted in deciding whether particular liberty restrictions are
constitutionally valid, and more whether there is “a sufficient substantive
justification” for the deprivation of liberty.153 Essentially, the procedural due
process analysis offers a utilitarian and consequentialist view, conducting an
interest-balancing review of the risks and benefits of procedural
mechanisms.154 The substantive due process analysis, on the other hand, is
most closely related to deontological philosophy: it is founded on a protection
of “[o]ur country’s basic norms of fairness, not merely our institutional
procedural protections.”155

150
151

2013)).

Memorandum of Points, supra note 128, at 17, 32–34.
Id. at 33 (quoting 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 4, 6(c)); United States v. Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d 885, 906 (9th Cir.

152 The proposal for “national security courts” raises similar issues. As Professor Steve Vladeck has
pointed out, such proposals failed to answer the question of “[j]ust who are the terrorism suspects who can be
subjected to this ‘third’ way, and what checks are there to protect against false positives?” Stephen I. Vladeck,
The Case Against National Security Courts, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 505, 524 (2009) (emphasis omitted).
153 Chemerinsky, supra note 96, at 1501.
154 Cassandra Burke Robertson, Due Process in the American Identity, 64 ALA. L. REV. 255, 263 (2012).
155 Walter C. Long, Appeasing a God: Rawlsian Analysis of Herrera v. Collins and a Substantive Due
Process Right to Innocent Life, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 215, 219 (1994); Robertson, supra note 154, at 281 n.136
(“[S]ubstantive due process . . . may well have a basis in deontological philosophy.”).
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Of course, substance and procedure can never be entirely separated.156
Legal scholar Jenny Martinez has described the “elusive relationship” between
the two as “one of the recurring and unresolved debates in legal theory.”157
Both courts and scholars have recognized that fair procedures are insufficient
alone to guarantee protection of life, liberty and property.158
Scholar Timothy Sandefur used the Shirley Jackson short story “The
Lottery” to illustrate the role played by substantive due process.159 In the story,
villagers follow strict procedures to randomly choose an individual to be killed
by stoning.160 The procedures bear every hallmark of fairness and neutrality,
but ultimately there is no justification for the killing, which is carried out only
because it is a long-standing tradition—it is a “fundamentally arbitrary, yet
regular procedure.”161 The very fact that the procedural protections are
scrupulously enforced, ensuring that each citizen has an equal chance of
selection, only emphasizes the horror of the government’s action.
As with the procedural due process analysis, the substantive due process
framework raises special challenges in the context of national security. In
national security cases, the need for secrecy makes it difficult to judge when
156 Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 321 (2004) (“We can easily
rationalize the sacrifice of procedural justice from a consequentialist perspective . . . . In the end, however,
these rationalizations ring hollow. Procedure without justice sacrifices legitimacy.”); Ann Woolhandler,
Procedural Due Process Liberty Interests 6 (Univ. Va. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper
Grp., Paper No. 41, Aug. 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2641869 (“[S]ubstantive
constitutional rights are in fact late-coming procedural due process interests, and . . . the procedural protections
for them may in some ways be more limited than for natural liberty and traditional property.”).
157 Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1019
(2008).
158 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (“Although a literal reading of the
Clause might suggest that it governs only the procedures by which a State may deprive persons of liberty, for
at least 105 years . . . the Clause has been understood to contain a substantive component as well, one ‘barring
certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’”); James W.
Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST.
COMMENT. 315, 319 (1999) (arguing that due process was created to protect property rights, and that judicial
decisions that place property in a “subordinate constitutional category are historically unsound”); Timothy
Sandefur, Privileges, Immunities, and Substantive Due Process, 5 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 115, 171–72 (2010)
(“Either the Constitution means what it says about protecting individual freedom, or it does not. Either there
are rights that no state may justly take from us, as the authors of Constitution and of the Fourteenth
Amendment believed, or rights are permissions which may be contracted or expanded to meet the needs of the
collective.”).
159 Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the Promise of Lawful Rule, 35 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 297 (2012) (citing Shirley Jackson, The Lottery (1949), reprinted in SHIRLEY
JACKSON: NOVELS AND STORIES 227–35 (Joyce Carol Oates ed., 2010)).
160 Id.
161 Id.
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government action meets the “fundamentally arbitrary” standard. Certainly,
individual error can appear both arbitrary and unreasonable, as when an
individual is placed on the no-fly list merely because an agent accidentally
checked the wrong box on a form.162 But the more difficult challenge is to
identify the non-individualized, systematic deprivations of liberty that
nonetheless are fundamentally arbitrary. In the no-fly context, the substantive
due process question focuses on the standard of proof: Is “reasonable
suspicion” of a connection to terrorism a sufficient justification to forbid
someone from flying, or is the standard so low as to be fundamentally
arbitrary?
1. Doctrinal Uncertainty
The Supreme Court has never clearly defined the contours of the doctrine
of substantive due process. It is true that the application of a substantive gloss
on the Due Process Clause has deep historical roots.163 In spite of this
historical pedigree, the doctrine remains indeterminate; as constitutional
scholar Erwin Chemerinsky has pointed out, “[S]trangely enough, if you look
through Supreme Court opinions you will never find a definition [of
substantive due process].”164 Instead of defining the doctrine, the Court has
treated it as a gap-filler to be applied when procedural due process fails to
adequately protect against individual liberty; it has explained that substantive
due process “forbids the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty
interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”165

162

Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, HigherLaw Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 669 (2009) (“On balance, the historical
evidence shows that one widespread understanding of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in 1791
included judicial recognition and enforcement of unenumerated natural and customary rights against
congressional action.”); Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J.
408, 495, 500 (2010) (arguing that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would have given “due process”
a substantive meaning as well as a procedural one, as “[b]y 1868, a recognizable form of substantive due
process had been embraced by a large majority of the courts that had considered the issue, including the U.S.
Supreme Court . . . , and by courts in at least twenty of the thirty-seven then-existing states,” but suggesting
that the framers of the Fifth Amendment in 1791 would likely have given only a procedural meaning to the due
process clause).
164 Chemerinsky, supra note 96, at 1501.
165 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
163
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Further compounding the lack of definitional clarity, the Court’s use of the
doctrine has varied significantly over time.166 Its earliest application was to
invalidate laws that interfered with freedom of contract and economic liberty,
as exemplified in Lochner v. New York, where the Court struck down a state
law limiting the hours of bakery employees.167 The Court, however, backed
away from this application in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,168 which upheld
state minimum-wage laws and “ended the Lochner era” by changing direction
to hold that economic regulations should instead be measured by a deferential
rational-basis standard.169 Although the Court distanced itself from substantive
due process to invalidate economic regulations, it continued to apply it in other
areas—most notably, striking down restrictions on abortion,170 on “excessive”
punitive damage awards,171 as well as on sodomy laws,172 and, most recently,
in upholding a right to same-sex marriage.173
The cases in which the Court has declined to find a substantive due process
right best illustrate the limits of the doctrine. In Washington v. Glucksberg, the
Court held that there was no substantive due process right to physician-assisted
suicide.174 Although the Court was divided, a majority agreed that substantive

166 F. Patrick Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages Awards: “Morals Without
Technique”?, 60 FLA. L. REV. 349, 377–78 (2008) (“The Court’s development of its substantive due process
framework has been characterized by a preference for ad hoc decisions instead of the construction of an
underlying theoretical framework.”).
167 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a law that limited the hours that could be worked by bakery
employees in New York).
168 300 U.S. 379 (1937); see also DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 2 (2011) (“The Supreme Court withdrew constitutional
protection for liberty of contract in the 1930s. Since then, a hostile perspective inherited from the Progressives
has virtually monopolized scholarly discussion of the Court’s liberty of contract decisions.”).
169 300 U.S. at 391, 399; Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L.
REV. 527, 543 (2015).
170 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L.
REV. 63, 72 (2006) (“Roe brought modern substantive due process into full flower.”).
171 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585–86 (1996); Max N. Helveston, Judicial
Deregulation of Consumer Markets, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1739, 1753 (2015) (“In the early nineties, however,
the Supreme Court found that it was possible that punitive damages awards could violate defendants’
procedural and substantive due process rights.”); Laura J. Hines & N. William Hines, Constitutional
Constraints on Punitive Damages: Clarity, Consistency, and the Outlier Dilemma, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1257,
1259 (2015) (conducting an empirical review of court decisions analyzing punitive-damage awards).
172 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
173 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (“[T]he Court has reiterated that the right to
marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause.”); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013)
(invalidating the federal Defense of Marriage Act).
174 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997).
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due process should protect only “fundamental rights found to be deeply rooted
in our legal tradition.”175 By limiting the protection to such “fundamental
rights,” the Court concluded that “it avoids the need for complex balancing of
competing interests in every case.”176 Infringing on such “deeply rooted”
fundamental rights would require a compelling state interest, but governmental
infringement on individual liberties not meeting the “fundamental” threshold
would require only a rational basis.177 The Court acknowledged that it had
earlier held that there was a fundamental right to refuse unwanted lifesaving
treatment, but it distinguished “the long legal tradition protecting the decision
to refuse unwanted medical treatment” from the more recent development of
support for assisted suicide.178 After concluding that assisted suicide could not
be considered a fundamental right, the Court applied a rational-basis standard
of review and concluded that the state law prohibiting assisted suicide was
“reasonably related” to the state’s goals of “protecting the vulnerable from
coercion” and “protecting disabled and terminally ill people from prejudice,
negative and inaccurate stereotypes, and ‘societal indifference.’”179
More recently, the Court has divided over the question of whether
substantive due process would give rise to a protectable interest in a spouse’s
immigration status.180 A majority of the Court agreed that the claim—brought
by a U.S. citizen, seeking review of the denial of her Afghani husband’s visa—
should be dismissed.181 The petitioner, Fauzia Din, had come to the United
States as a refugee in 2000 and obtained citizenship in 2007.182 When her
husband sought to join her in the United States, his visa was denied under the
“terrorism bar” with no explanation.183 Because he had no ability to enter the
United States or otherwise seek judicial review of the visa denial, Din filed suit
“on his behalf, alleging that the Government’s denial of her husband’s visa
application violated her constitutional rights” and claiming “that the
Government denied her due process of law when, without adequate
175

Id. at 722.
Id.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 725; see also id. at 728 (“The history of the law’s treatment of assisted suicide in this country has
been and continues to be one of the rejection of nearly all efforts to permit it.”).
179 Id. at 732.
180 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (plurality opinion); see also Woolhandler, supra 156, at 52–53
(suggesting that Din’s claim might be best characterized as a “hybrid liberty interest” with both procedural and
substantive aspects).
181 Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 2131.
182 Id. at 2132.
183 Id. at 2131–32.
176
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explanation of the reason for the visa denial, it deprived her of her
constitutional right to live in the United States with her spouse.”184
Interestingly, however, there was no majority agreement on the question of
whether the case raised a substantive due process issue. Four dissenting
Justices—Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan—would have granted
relief; in an opinion authored by Justice Breyer, they identified a fundamental
right of marriage, “which encompasses the right of spouses to live together and
to raise a family,” and concluded that the government’s failure to offer a
reason for the visa denial violated the petitioner’s due process rights.185 Five
justices—a majority of the Court—voted to deny relief, but for different
reasons. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined the plurality opinion
authored by Justice Scalia, which concluded that no fundamental right had
been infringed; the opinion pointed to historical limits placed on immigration
matters, and emphasized that under the Expatriation Act of 1907, a female U.S.
citizen who married a foreigner would automatically take his nationality.186
Justices Kennedy and Alito concurred in the result, but would not reach the
question of substantive due process, instead deferring to the strength of the
government’s interest in national security.187 Thus, they concluded that even if
the petitioner did have a “protected liberty interest” in her husband’s
immigration status, “the Government satisfied due process when it notified
Din’s husband that his visa was denied under the immigration statute’s
terrorism bar.”188
Finally, the Court again returned to the question of substantive due process
in Obergefell v. Hodges, in which the Court struck down state prohibitions
against same-sex marriage.189 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in
Obergefell concluded that marriage was a fundamental right and that
prohibitions against same-sex marriage “would be unjustified under the
Fourteenth Amendment.”190 Four other Justices—Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan—signed on to the majority opinion in its entirety. Two
184

Id. at 2131.
Id. at 2142 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 2135 (plurality opinion) (“Thus, a woman in Din’s position not only lacked a liberty interest that
might be affected by the Government’s disposition of her husband’s visa application, she lost her own rights as
a citizen upon marriage.”).
187 Id. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he notice given was constitutionally adequate, particularly
in light of the national security concerns the terrorism bar addresses.”).
188 Id. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
189 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
190 Id. at 2606.
185
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of the dissents in the case emphasized the dissenting Justices’ objections not
just to same-sex marriage itself but also to the larger doctrine of substantive
due process. Justice Thomas, in a dissent joined by Justice Scalia, criticized the
Court’s opinion more broadly, but described the doctrine of substantive due
process as entirely indefensible.191 This position was consistent with Justices
Scalia and Justice Thomas’s earlier repudiation of substantive due process in
the punitive-damages context.192 In Obergefell, however, Chief Justice Roberts
(joined again by Justices Scalia and Thomas) also wrote a lengthy dissent that
sharply criticized the doctrine of substantive due process, writing that the
Court’s “aggressive application of substantive due process breaks sharply with
decades of precedent and returns the Court to the unprincipled approach of
Lochner.”193 Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent stopped short of condemning the
doctrine in its entirety, but made clear that, in his opinion, the doctrine should
be applied only to rights that are “grounded in history.”194 Justice Alito also
issued a short dissent in the case that set out his objections to the majority
opinion without defining his view of the contours of a right to substantive due
process;195 in an interview after the opinion was released, he was quoted as
saying, “I don’t know what the limits of substantive liberty protection under
the 14th Amendment are at this point.”196
2. Substantive Due Process, National Security, and Secrecy
Even though the doctrine of substantive due process is less than clear, it is
still possible to sketch out the Court’s likely approach to a substantive due
process claim against the no-fly list. The first step is to identify the liberty
interest protected—one that is “deeply rooted” in history and tradition and is so

191 Id. at 2632 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Even if the doctrine of substantive due process were somehow
defensible—it is not—petitioners still would not have a claim.”).
192 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 361 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Hubbard, supra note
166, at 357 (“Justices Scalia and Thomas have consistently dissented from the opinions establishing the
substantive framework, arguing that the Constitution provides no substantive limit on the size of punitive
damages awards and that the framework cannot be applied in a principled fashion.”).
193 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2618–19 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 2618 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977)).
195 Id. at 2640–43 (Alito, J., dissenting).
196 Ed Whelan, Justice Alito’s Conversation with Bill Kristol: Substantive Due Process, NAT’L REV. (July
20, 2015, 10:27 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/421391/justice-alitos-conversation-billkristol-substantive-due-process-ed-whelan.
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fundamental to “the concept of ordered liberty” that “neither liberty nor justice
would exist” in its absence.197
Delineating this right can be difficult, as its definition—and thus its
protection—can vary greatly depending on what level of abstraction or
generality is applied.198 The Supreme Court has held that there is a
fundamental right to interstate travel, which would appear to make an easy
case for a substantive due process challenge to the no-fly list.199 However,
persons on the no-fly list may still travel relatively easily by car or bus.200 So
travel in general is not restrained, only air travel—but if the right is defined as
a right to travel by air, then it loses its “deeply rooted” place in history, as air
travel has existed only in the modern era.
The Supreme Court has previously recognized a constitutional right to
international travel.201 It held, however, that this right is not a fundamental one
that will be protected by strict scrutiny; instead, it has stated that “the ‘right’ of
international travel has been considered to be no more than an aspect of the
‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As such
this ‘right,’ the Court has held, can be regulated within the bounds of due

197 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (first quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977); and then quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)).
198 See, e.g., Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward A New Equilibrium in
Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 242 (2014) (explaining that higher levels of generality
increase definitional similarity, whereas lower levels of generality emphasize definitional distinctions);
Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
1057, 1058 (1990) (“The more abstractly one states the already-protected right, the more likely it becomes that
the claimed right will fall within its protection. For instance, did the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut
recognize the narrow right to use contraception or the broader right to make a variety of procreative
decisions?”).
199 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999) (“The ‘right to travel’. . . . protects the right of a citizen of one
State to enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly
alien[,] . . . and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other
citizens of that State.”).
200 Latif v. Holder, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1303 (D. Or. 2013) (“Although there are perhaps viable
alternatives to flying for domestic travel within the continental United States such as traveling by car or train,
the Court disagrees with Defendants’ contention that international air travel is a mere convenience in light of
the realities of our modern world. Such an argument ignores the numerous reasons an individual may have for
wanting or needing to travel overseas quickly such as for the birth of a child, the death of a loved one, a
business opportunity, or a religious obligation.”); Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 06-00545 WHA,
2012 WL 6652362, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2012) (“While the Constitution does not ordinarily guarantee the
right to travel by any particular form of transportation, given that other forms of travel usually remain possible,
the fact remains that for international travel, air transport in these modern times is practically the only form of
transportation, travel by ship being prohibitively expensive or so it will be presumed at the pleading stage.”).
201 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
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process.”202 Professor Jeffrey Kahn has argued convincingly that the Supreme
Court should recognize a fundamental right to travel internationally, rooted in
the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.203 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has not yet done so, and even if it did, recognition of such a
right could still leave substantial travel restrictions in place even if the no-fly
list were limited to domestic air travel.
Another potential liberty interest is the individual’s right to be free of
“stigma and humiliation” that come from being accused of terrorism and
publicly denied boarding.204 The Northern District of California identified such
an interest in Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Security, when it found that
due process required the government to correct its records and remove Rahinah
Ibrahim from the no-fly list after an FBI agent’s accidental mark in the wrong
check-box landed her on the list.205 The Supreme Court has held that reputation
alone is not a fundamental interest,206 but it has left open the possibility that
reputational stigma may rise to such a level when combined with other
governmental action that curtails or denies individual rights.207 It may be that
the restriction of travel, combined with the reputational harm and stigma
associated with placement on the no-fly list would together meet the “stigma
plus” test to qualify for heightened scrutiny.208 The recent debates regarding
202 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 317 (1978)).
Of course, procedural due process would still require appropriate procedural measures to protect against
erroneous deprivation. See supra note 99.
203 See Jeffrey Kahn, International Travel and the Constitution, 56 UCLA L. REV. 271, 348 (2008)
(“[I]nternational travel should be considered a fundamental right protected by strict judicial scrutiny. Denial of
the citizen’s right to leave his or her country and return home again should be permitted only when that
restriction is the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling state interest.”).
204 Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
205 Id. at 916 (“Agent Kelley misunderstood the directions on the form and erroneously nominated Dr.
Ibrahim to the TSA’s no-fly list and the Interagency Border Information System (“IBIS”). He did not intend to
do so. . . . He checked the wrong boxes, filling out the form exactly the opposite way from the instructions on
the form.”).
206 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (“[P]etitioners’ defamatory publications, however seriously
they may have harmed respondent’s reputation, did not deprive him of any ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests
protected by the Due Process Clause.”).
207 Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in Sex Offender
Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1126 (2012) (“And so was born the concept of ‘stigma plus,’
which demands not only proof of injury to one’s reputation, but also that the injury was accompanied by the
denial or curtailment of a tangible interest.”).
208 See Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 87 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A] ‘stigma plus’ claim requires a plaintiff to
allege (1) the utterance of a statement about her that is injurious to her reputation, ‘that is capable of being
proved false, and that he or she claims is false,’ and (2) ‘some tangible and material state-imposed burden . . .
in addition to the stigmatizing statement.’” (citations omitted) (ellipsis in original) (quoting Doe v. Dep’t of
Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 2001))); Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and
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prohibiting gun purchases to anyone on the no-fly list and other watchlists
further demonstrate politicians’ and the public’s view of individuals on these
lists.209 New York Governor Andrew Cuomo commented that selling guns to
people in that category is “madness,” adding, “I am a gun owner. Nobody is
demonizing the ownership of guns. But not for the mentally ill, not for people
who committed crimes and not for people who are suspected terrorists.”210 The
consequences of being put on the no-fly list are substantial and only risk
growing as politicians try to devise new ways of showing that they are taking
decisive action.
Finally, aside from the doctrinal difficulty of prevailing on a traditional
substantive due process claim, there is also a practical difficulty. The two most
recent Supreme Court substantive due process cases—Kerry and Obergefell—
suggest it would be difficult to get a majority of the Court to support a
substantive due process challenge to the no-fly list. Justice Thomas has
rejected the doctrine in its entirety, and Chief Justice Roberts has expressed a
very narrow view of the doctrine. Justice Kennedy, who was willing to apply
the doctrine expansively in Obergefell, appeared to take a much narrower
approach when national security was a countervailing interest, and Justice
Alito likewise gave great deference to the national security interest in Kerry.
Only four justices were willing to recognize a substantive liberty interest in
both Kerry and Obergefell, suggesting that the no-fly plaintiffs may have an
uphill battle in obtaining relief on their substantive due process claim even if
the Court were to agree that their asserted rights could qualify as sufficiently
deep-rooted in history to qualify as fundamental.
This difficulty is compounded by the judiciary’s traditional deference to the
Executive Branch in matters of national security. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged this deference, writing that “[w]e have repeatedly held that the
Government’s regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate
circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty interest. For example, in times
of war or insurrection, when society’s interest is at its peak, the Government

Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-Invention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79, 131 (2009) (“[T]here should be no
question that an individual wrongfully branded a terrorist by a state agency in this way has suffered a
deprivation of liberty.”).
209 Mark Hensch, NY Governor: ‘Madness’ Not to Ban No-Fly List Gun Sales, HILL: BRIEFING ROOM
(Dec. 14, 2015, 10:37 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/263108-ny-governor-itsmadness-not-banning-no-fly-list-gun-sales.
210 Id.
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may detain individuals whom the Government believes to be dangerous.”211
This deference is especially strong in matters within the Executive Branch’s
sphere of competence, which includes the development and maintenance of
“many different kinds of powerful databases that implicate individuals’
interests in privacy, due process and equal protection,” which “courts review
leniently” if at all.212 As with procedural due process, the importance of
national security and the secrecy inherent in the security process make it
difficult to ensure protection of individual liberty.
IV. TOWARD A UNIFIED MODEL OF DUE PROCESS
Under the current doctrinal formulations, neither procedural nor substantive
due process analyses sufficiently protect liberty interests in the shadow of
national security secrecy. The court cannot weigh the risks and benefits of
additional procedural protections when the evidence illuminating those
elements is kept secret—and especially when the very interest that the
government seeks to protect is secrecy itself. The most current formulation of
substantive due process, with its sharp dividing line between “fundamental”
and “non-fundamental” rights, also seems to be an imperfect fit. It is not clear
that either international travel or an individual’s reputation interest would rise
to the level of a fundamental right to be protected by strict scrutiny—and, in
any case, national security itself is a compelling state interest. Thus, the
government’s interest in secrecy may well trump the individual’s liberty
interest, at least in the abstract. At a broad level of generality, courts are likely
to agree that there are compelling state interests in keeping terrorism
investigations confidential and in preventing known terrorists from boarding
commercial aircraft.213
211

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987).
Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 676, 697 n.63 (2005) (“Generally, the courts defer to the superior position of executive officials
designing and maintaining databases to evaluate their necessity and attendant risks to individual rights relative
to available alternatives, and to consider ways to minimize infringements of individual rights beyond the
relatively blunt requirements that a court is equipped to propose or enforce.”); see also Wayne McCormack,
U.S. Judicial Independence: Victim in the “War on Terror,” 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 305, 401 (2014)
(“[U]ndue deference to the Executive in ‘time of crisis’ has undermined the independent role of the Judiciary.
Torture, executive detentions, illegal surveillance, and now killing of U.S. citizens, have escaped judicial
review under a variety of excuses.”).
213 See Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp 3d 1134, 1154 (D. Or. 2014) (“[T]he Government’s interest in
combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest order.” (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010))); Gail Sullivan, Why the No-Fly List Was Declared Unconstitutional, WASH. POST
(June 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/06/25/judge-rules-no-fly-listunconstitutional/ (“In her opinion, Brown recognized the government’s compelling interest in combatting
212
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But even if these interests are compelling in the abstract, there is a growing
recognition among courts and scholars that, in numerous cases, significant
liberty interests are losing out not to valid security needs, but instead to
bureaucratic error and overreach.214 The broad “reasonable suspicion” standard
for inclusion on the no-fly list creates room for error, where even an FBI
agent’s accidental mark on a check-box form has led to an innocent traveler’s
inclusion on the no-fly list.215 Because the review process was secret, the
traveler had no way to prove that the government made a mistake—several
years after she sued, the government reviewed its records and realized that her
inclusion on the list was solely due to a typo.216 Finally, there are repeated
stories of government officials placing people on the list for reasons not
authorized under their own procedures, such as coercing them to become
informants on members of their ethnic or religious community.217 When there

terrorism. However, well-established case law says even compelling government interests must be balanced
against citizens’ constitutional rights. The issues with the no-fly list aren’t exactly new—the opinion cites
several post-911 cases where that balancing act involved national security interests.”).
214 Kahn, supra note 203, at 321; Anya Bernstein, The Hidden Costs of Terrorist Watch Lists, 61 BUFF. L.
REV. 461, 463 (2013) (“[T]he incentive structures surrounding terrorist watch lists push agents and agencies to
exaggerate dangers, putting names on watch lists that do not belong there.”); Danielle Keats Citron,
Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1256 (2008) (“Every week, approximately 1,500
airline travelers reportedly are mislabeled as terrorists due to errors in the data-matching program known as the
‘No Fly’ list. Innocent individuals face extensive questioning and miss flights, never knowing why the
automated system has targeted them.” (footnote omitted)); Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The
Explosion of Targeted, Noncustodial Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 377 (2014) (“It might be
legitimate, for example, to prevent a suspected terrorist from boarding a plane soon after the government
learns of his involvement in a nascent terrorist plot. But why is it legitimate for the restraint to last months or
years in the absence of sufficient evidence to bring a criminal charge for an inchoate conspiracy or attempt
crime?”); Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1410 (2008) (arguing that the no-fly list,
“if impermeable to challenge or inspection in any reasonable way, should cause a court pause”); Justin
Florence, Note, Making the No Fly List Fly: A Due Process Model for Terrorist Watchlists, 115 YALE L.J.
2148, 2180 (2006) (“Decisions by the agency concerning who is listed on the No Fly List or denied a
transportation-sector job should be subject to judicial review in Article III courts.”).
215 Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
216 Id. at 928–29. Some argue that “the watchlists were riddled with errors” from the start. SUSAN N.
HERMAN, TAKING LIBERTIES: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 68 (2011).
A 2009 report revealed that “in 78 percent of cases, nominations to the list were not timely and sometimes
were based on outdated or simply incorrect information . . . . At the same time, the FBI failed to remove names
of cleared people in a timely manner in 72 percent of cases.” Id.; see also KAHN, supra note 6, at 153 (“Once
on the list, it is hard to get off the list.”).
217 See Shirin Sinnar, Towards A Fairer Terrorist Watchlist, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Winter 2015, at 4,
5 (“Recurrent allegations that FBI agents threaten individuals with watchlisting to coerce them into becoming
government informants lends support to the idea that No Fly list standards have strayed from their original
purpose of averting true threats to civil aviation.”); Spencer Ackerman, No-Fly List Used by FBI to Coerce
Muslims into Informing, Lawsuit Claims, GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2014, 10:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/apr/23/no-fly-list-fbi-coerce-muslims; Kevin Gosztola, Hundreds of Thousands of People
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is no disclosure of what information was used to support the government’s
decision to add the individual to the list, there is no way to challenge that
determination, regardless of whether the decision was supported by the
evidence, and, importantly, regardless of whether it was made in good faith.
Thus, a narrowly applied procedural due process doctrine and a narrowly
applied substantive due process doctrine both fail to protect individuals’ liberty
interests and also give rise to a widespread sense of perceived injustice. This
perception is highly relevant—the idea of due process is not merely a legal
doctrine, but is woven into the very fabric of the American identity.218 A
perception that liberty has been arbitrarily restrained weakens the rule of law
within the national identity.219
There is no obvious answer to reducing the disconnect between the failure
to protect liberty interests via procedural and substantive due process doctrines
and the widespread sense of perceived injustice. Procedural due process rights
could be added, requiring greater disclosure of evidence and additional
mechanisms by which individuals can challenge the government’s
restrictions.220 This change would create difficulties on both sides, however—
first, it may not fully account for governmental interests in keeping classified
information secret, and second, it still may not correct arbitrary deprivations of
liberty that come from the low “reasonable suspicion” standard applied to
inclusion on the no-fly list.221 Substantive due process protections could
likewise be expanded to protect against such arbitrary deprivations of liberty,
but the “compelling state interest” requirement traditionally associated with

Unaffiliated with Terrorist Group on US Government Watchlist, SHADOWPROOF (Aug. 5, 2014),
https://shadowproof.com/2014/08/05/hundreds-of-thousands-of-individuals-not-associated-with-terroristgroup-on-us-governments-watchlist/ (“The presence of Dearborn in the list of top five cities is one of the most
obvious indicators that the watchlist is filled with the names of people, who would not be on the list if the
national security state did not have a cultural bias toward Muslims. Dearborn, as described in the report, is a
city ‘much smaller than the other cities.’ It only has 96,000 residents. Forty percent of the Dearborn population
is ‘of Arab descent,’ according to the US Census Bureau.”).
218 See Robertson, supra note 154, at 262 (“[D]ue process is more than a legal principle; it is also a
personal value that carries a special weight in the American identity. When people talk about what it means to
be American, the respect for procedural rights is paramount.”).
219 Id. at 260 (noting that “the concept of procedural due process derives from a commitment to the rule of
law”).
220 JARED COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43730, TERRORIST DATABASES AND THE NO FLY LIST:
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND HURDLES TO LITIGATION 13–15 (2015).
221 See supra Part III.A.
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substantive due process may restrict executive power more than the judiciary is
willing to do when national security is at stake.222
A better solution may be found by combining the essential elements of
procedural and substantive due process. After all, there is no real historical or
textual reason why the two doctrines should be separate; they are both founded
in the same constitutional language,223 and both have long been viewed as part
of the essential guarantee of liberty that the constitution protects.224 This
combined standard would not replace the familiar doctrinal analysis of
procedural and substantive due process in the ordinary case. Instead, it would
apply in the limited situation where the dictates of national security require a
higher deference to interests of confidentiality and secrecy—but where there is
nonetheless a significant danger that liberty will be restricted in ways that are
not warranted by these interests.
A combined standard would begin with recognition of, and some level of
protection for, even non-fundamental rights. At a basic level, this position is
non-controversial. After all, even the Supreme Court’s framework for rationalbasis review provides some substantive protection to non-fundamental rights,
albeit one that requires only that the governmental restriction be rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.225 Of course it is rare that rational-basis
review will act to constrain governmental action, but this has more to do with
the procedure by which the Court has applied the standard, and not with the
standard itself. In particular, the Court has applied “a strong presumption of
validity”226 to government action subject to rational basis review, has specified
that “a legislature that creates these categories need not ‘actually articulate at
any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification,’”227 and has

222

See supra Part III.B.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
224 Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and
the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 848 (2003) (“Of course, substance and procedure cannot be so
‘neatly separated.’ . . . At the margin, at least, the distinction between substance and procedure blurs.”); see
also F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW: A COURSE OF LECTURES 1 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1963) (1909) (“[S]ubstantive law [is] . . . being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure.”
(quoting Henry Sumner Maine, Dissertations on Early Law and Custom 389 (1891))); Woolhandler, supra
note 156, at 4–5 (“Modern discussions of procedural due process often focus on the Supreme Court’s requiring
hearings or other process in administrative agencies . . . . But another pervasive aspect of procedural due
process is the Court’s requiring judicial process when particular interests are at stake.”).
225 Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City, 816 F.2d 539, 543 (10th Cir. 1987).
226 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993).
227 Id. at 320 (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 25 (1992)).
223
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provided that “any reasonably conceivable state of facts”228 will support a
rational-basis finding, whether or not there is evidentiary support for it.229
Because the Court’s application of the rational basis test erects such a high
procedural barrier, it effectively insulates some governmental restrictions even
when they lack a real relationship to legitimate government interests.230 But
even though the Supreme Court made it difficult to challenge illegitimate
governmental action, the Court has always been clear that the constitutional
legitimacy of governmental action requires a rational basis.231 And in some
cases—especially when significant liberty issues are at stake—the Court has
been less willing to presume the validity of governmental action, applying the
rational-basis standard “with bite.”232 Thus, the Court has applied the rationalbasis standard to strike down a prohibition on allowing former Communists to
practice law,233 a zoning law that would exclude group homes for individuals
with developmental disabilities,234 and a state law that sought to prohibit local
governments from including sexual orientation in antidiscrimination
ordinances.235

228

Id. at 313 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)).
Id.; see also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 132 (1876) (“If no state of circumstances could exist to
justify such a statute, then we may declare this one void, because in excess of the legislative power of the
State. But if it could, we must presume it did.”).
230 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 679 (3d ed. 2006) (“[I]t
also can be argued that the Court has gone too far in its deference under the rational basis test. Unfair laws are
allowed to stand because a conceivable legitimate purpose can be identified for virtually any law.”); Clark
Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the Rational Basis Test, 1 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 898, 910 (2005)
(“There comes a point where the deck is stacked so thoroughly against a litigant that the result of the case is
effectively preordained. Saddling rational basis plaintiffs with a technically unattainable burden of proof and
requiring them to construct a trial court record sufficient to rebut arguments that have not even been made yet
would seem to reach that point.”).
231 Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313 (“[A] statutory classification that neither proceeds along
suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge
if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”).
232 See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Private Ordering in the Market for Professional Services, 94 B.U. L.
REV. 179, 215, 234 (2014) (“[T]here are signs the Court may be willing to inquire into the ‘rationality’ of
legislation a bit more skeptically.”); Steven Menashi & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rational Basis with Economic
Bite, 8 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 1055, 1069 (2014) (“‘[R]ational basis with bite’ has reappeared recently in
several circuits’ review of statutes infringing economic liberty.”).
233 Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 246–47 (1957) (“There is no evidence in the
record which rationally justifies a finding that Schware was morally unfit to practice law.”).
234 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (emphasizing that even under
rational basis review, “[t]he State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so
attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational”).
235 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (concluding that the ostensible purposes of the legislation
were “so far removed” from the “breadth of the amendment” that it was “impossible to credit them”).
229
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The current “reasonable suspicion” standard for inclusion on the no-fly list
may violate even a rational-basis standard of review—especially if courts are
willing to give teeth to the rational-basis standard. Certainly, the government
has a strong—even compelling—interest in preventing terrorist attacks.236 But
the evidence appears overwhelming that the current procedure to include
people on the no-fly list does absolutely nothing to assist in preventing such
attacks.237 When individuals on the list can still enter the country at border
crossings, can work in the secured area of domestic airports, can purchase
guns, can obtain commercial driver’s licenses and work as school bus drivers,
then has the list done anything to reduce the threat of terrorism?238
Indeed, the list may be counterproductive, as law enforcement agencies are
reportedly reluctant to place the most dangerous terrorism suspects on the list
at all.239 In some cases, “agencies who have genuine leads on suspected
terrorists purposely choose not to add those suspects’ names to the No Fly List
because they believe the need to circulate the list to airlines means its contents
cannot be made sufficiently secure.”240 Similarly, the sheer number of
individuals on the list—and the widely varying and, sometimes, tenuous
reasons for inclusion on the list—may obscure the much smaller number of
individuals on the list who pose a more immediate threat.241 “Reasonable
suspicion” can apply so broadly that it fails to do its job in identifying those
who are most likely to pose a threat to aviation security.242 As a result, it is
likely to be less effective than a more narrowly targeted standard.243

236

See Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1153 (D. Or. 2014).
See supra Part III.
238 See supra Part I. One of the plaintiffs in the litigation surrounding the no-fly list was, in fact, a bus
driver. Third Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at 6. He lost his employment, however, when co-workers
complained about having to work with someone who is on the No-Fly list once the story aired on television.
Declaration of Amir Meshal in Opposition to Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, Latif v.
Lynch, 3:10-cv-00750-BR, 2016 WL 1239925 (D. Or. Mar. 28, 2016).
239 See Chang, supra note 18 (noting that opponents of using the terrorist watchlist for gun control raise
the question, “Why tip off an actual terrorist that we’re on to him by telling him he failed a background
check?”).
240 Aaron H. Caplan, Nonattainder as a Liberty Interest, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1203, 1255.
241 See Chang, supra note 18 (noting a former counterterrorism official’s explanation that “a lot of totally
innocent people end up on the terrorism watch list—such as business associates, roommates or landlords of
suspected terrorists”).
242 See KAHN, supra note 6, at 151 (“From a policy perspective, a terrorist screening database that
contains the names of nonterrorists is worse than unhelpful—it is a resource-consuming distraction.”).
243 Moreover, the current costs of the list at its current size are exorbitant, having been estimated at $536
million to $966 million as of 2009. See Marcus Holmes, Just How Much Does That Cost, Anyway? An
Analysis of the Financial Costs and Benefits of the “No-Fly” List, HOMELAND SEC. AFF., Jan. 2009, at 1, 18.
237
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Even if the Supreme Court would not strike down the “reasonable
suspicion” standard under rational basis review, it should modify the doctrinal
formulation used to evaluate due process in national security cases that
implicate both governmental secrecy interests and significant individual liberty
interests. Such a model would not be unprecedented.244 In recent years the
Court’s due process jurisprudence has evolved away from bright-line
categories toward a more flexible model of due process, especially where
constitutional protections intersect.245 This flexible standard motivated the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Obergefell, where the Court’s opinion invalidating
same-sex marriage restrictions rested on the “synergy” between the due
process and equal protection guarantees.246 Without due process protection for
the substantive right to marry, “central precepts of equality” would be
abridged.247
A similar synergy of core constitutional rights arises in the travel sphere.
First Amendment rights to practice religion and engage in political speech are
some of the most fundamental rights protected by the Constitution.248 If the
government is allowed to use religious practice and nonviolent political
opinion in restricting individuals’ freedom of travel, then those rights are
necessarily abridged.249 At a minimum, individuals (especially those who are
members of “suspect” religions and those who hold political opinions opposing
the political party in power) would suffer a chilling effect, fearing that a choice
to exercise their constitutional speech and religious rights would restrict their

244 See Nancy C. Marcus, Beyond Romer and Lawrence: The Right to Privacy Comes Out of the Closet,
15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 355, 358 (2006).
245 Id. (“While Romer adds teeth to rational basis equal protection analysis, Lawrence reciprocally
strengthens the liberty guarantees of substantive due process. Together, the two cases strengthen the overall
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment by focusing on the substantive rights at stake rather than allowing
strict nomenclatures or narrow classifications to determine the results of cases preemptively.”).
246 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015).
247 Id. at 2604.
248 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (“Long before there was general acknowledgment of
the need for universal formal education, the Religion Clauses had specifically and firmly fixed the right to free
exercise of religious beliefs, and buttressing this fundamental right was an equally firm, even if less explicit,
prohibition against the establishment of any religion by government. The values underlying these two
provisions relating to religion have been zealously protected, sometimes even at the expense of other interests
of admittedly high social importance.”); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966) (“Whatever
differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement
that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of
course includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which
government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters relating to political processes.”).
249 See Mohamed v. Holder, 995 F. Supp. 2d 520, 532 (E.D. Va. 2014).
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ability to engage in international travel.250 Even worse than a chilling effect,
however, is the possibility that those individuals could face actual
discrimination, suffering restricted liberty because of how they worship or
which political party they support.251
In the absence of national security concerns limiting plaintiffs’ access to
confidential government information, plaintiffs could potentially litigate
challenges to their placement on the no-fly list even under the “reasonable
suspicion” standard.252 In such a scenario, the government would have to
articulate a basis for suspecting that the plaintiffs were connected to terrorist
organizations or activity, and a court could determine the reasonableness of
that determination.253 The context in which the “reasonable suspicion”
standard was developed—search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment—
relies on such litigation to protect individual rights, albeit with a much smaller
deprivation of liberty at stake than permanent placement on the no-fly list.254
When the full range of evidence used in the no-fly list determination is
unavailable to the plaintiff, however, due process should require a higher
substantive standard. The Supreme Court has explained that the function of the
Due Process Clause is to “prevent unfair and mistaken deprivations” of the
constitutional protection of life, liberty, and property.255 Procedural protections
alone cannot adequately safeguard against such unfair and mistaken
deprivation of the right to travel when secret evidence is combined with the
low “reasonable suspicion” standard—this combination leaves too much room
for error and abuse. The government’s position is that the standard is required
by statutory language “which determined that the standard for inclusion on the
250 Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1089 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[P]laintiffs in a suit
for prospective relief based on a ‘chilling effect’ on speech can satisfy the requirement that their claim of
injury be ‘concrete and particularized’ by (1) evidence that in the past they have engaged in the type of speech
affected by the challenged government action; (2) affidavits or testimony stating a present desire, though no
specific plans, to engage in such speech; and (3) a plausible claim that they presently have no intention to do
so because of a credible threat that the statute will be enforced.”).
251 See, e.g., Mohamed, 995 F. Supp. 2d at 532 (questioning whether being “a member of a lawfully
operating social or religious organization whose membership may include other persons suspected of
terrorism” or “studying Arabic abroad” may permit inclusion on the no-fly list).
252 See, e.g., Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1141, 1151 (D. Or. 2014).
253 Defendant’s Consolidated Memorandum, supra note 3, at 41.
254 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968); see Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive
Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 337 (2015) (“The ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard first arose in
Terry v. Ohio, when the Supreme Court created a new threshold for Fourth Amendment suspicion, lower than
probable cause, to justify a brief detention.”).
255 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972).
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List should be based on predictive judgments about who ‘may’ be a threat to
civil aviation or national security.”256 This requirement, however, should be
interpreted consistently with constitutional guarantees of liberty. At its
broadest interpretation, anyone and everyone may be a threat to aviation
security; even in the pre-9/11 days, all passengers were required to go through
a metal detector.257
There is nothing in this directive that requires the application of a
“reasonable suspicion” standard. It may be a good basis on which to subject
passengers to heightened screening as opposed to placement on the no-fly list,
where liberty is maximally restricted—but in a way that avoids contact with
law enforcement and security officials.258 Nonetheless, when applied to the
much more serious risk of prohibiting air travel together, the risk of error under
such a standard is incompatible with the requirements of due process,
especially when considered in synergy with the chilling effect imposed on
fundamental speech and religious-practice rights.
An intermediate standard of proof requiring “clear and convincing”
evidence that an individual poses a risk to national security better balances the
interests of protecting both individual liberty and national security. The
Supreme Court has stated that it uses “the ‘clear, unequivocal and convincing’
standard of proof to protect particularly important individual interests in
various civil cases,”259 and has written that “[i]n cases involving individual
rights, whether criminal or civil, ‘[t]he standard of proof [at a minimum]
reflects the value society places on individual liberty.’”260 Thus, the Court has
upheld this standard in the context of civil commitment of the mentally ill,
which likewise balances both liberty interests and public safety.261 Professor
Alexander Tsesis has persuasively argued that the standard for civil
commitment should meet the criminal law standard of “beyond a reasonable

256 Defendant’s Consolidated Memorandum, supra note 3, at 41 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 114(h)(3) (2012),
which requires the government “to use information from government agencies to identify individuals on
passenger lists who may be a threat to civil aviation or national security”).
257 Robert S. Johnson, Metal Detector Searches: An Effective Means to Help Keep Weapons out of
Schools, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 197, 200 (2000) (noting that in 2000, people were accustomed to metal detector
searches in airports).
258 Caplan, supra note 240 (“If our actual airport security systems are functioning, even Osama bin Laden
himself should be allowed to board an aircraft, because all weaponry would be removed before boarding.”).
259 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979).
260 Id. at 425 (alteration in original) (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir 1971)).
261 Id. at 423 (“The standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the
relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.”).
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doubt,” given that incarceration and institutionalization both result in the same
deprivation of liberty,262 and indeed, a number of states have adopted that
standard.263 In the national security context, however, where the deprivation of
liberty is not as significant as institutionalization—but much more significant
than a mere traffic stop—a clear and convincing standard provides a balanced
approach.
Of course, adopting a higher standard of proof means that the government
must disclose its supporting evidence, at least to the court, if not also to the
petitioner.264 With the substantive bar increased, however, the procedural
analysis becomes less complicated, and makes it more likely that the judiciary
can manage secrecy interests through in-camera review. After all, it is nearly
impossible for individuals to prove that it is unreasonable for the government
to be suspicious of them—especially when they have no information about
what gave rise to the government’s suspicions. If, however, the standard
required “clear and convincing,” evidence of terrorist ties, then the list should
encompass a much more narrowly targeted group of individuals. In turn,
because there is more evidence tying those individuals to specific terrorist
threats, it is likely that people on the more limited list would have a better idea
of the government’s fears, and thus a better chance to rebut them even without
knowing, for example, the full range of information collected through
surveillance or other activities. In the remaining cases where an individual
struggles to rebut unknown evidence, the judge may take a more inquisitorial
role, directing the submission of evidence on both sides to make a reasoned
determination of the risk.265
Such a procedure would combine the essential bases of both substantive
and procedural due process. It would ensure that important freedoms—
including the right to travel and the right to be free of reputational stigma—
would achieve some level of protection even if they do not rise to the level of

262

Alexander Tsesis, Due Process in Civil Commitments, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253, 307 (2011).
Addington, 441 U.S. at 430–31 (“That some states have chosen—either legislatively or judicially—to
adopt the criminal law standard gives no assurance that the more stringent standard of proof is needed or is
even adaptable to the needs of all states.”).
264 See id. (noting that the clear and convincing standard would increase the government-plaintiff’s burden
of proof).
265 Daphne Barak-Erez & Matthew C. Waxman, Secret Evidence and the Due Process of Terrorist
Detentions, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 3, 39–41 (2009) (explaining how inquisitorial management can aid
the development of secret evidence, though warning that “[i]n countries like the United States, where
adversarial tradition runs very deep and judges are not accustomed to performing investigatory roles,
transitioning to judicial management to scrutinize secret evidence is difficult”).
263
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“fundamental rights” to be protected by strict scrutiny. Most importantly, it
would require that the government target its restrictions only where there is a
clear evidentiary basis for doing so. By clearly prohibiting the most arbitrary
and unsubstantiated liberty restrictions, this standard would then ease the way
for a more thorough analysis of the procedural protections due in the remaining
disputes and would enhance the judge’s ability to more accurately estimate the
risks and benefits of extending additional procedural protections.
CONCLUSION
Only immediate legislative or judicial intervention can put a halt to the
unconstitutional implementation of the no-fly list that the United States has
experienced so far. While people like Ted Kennedy did not remain on the nofly list for long, less connected individuals like Rahinah Ibrahim and many
others were not so lucky, receiving recourse after many years, if at all. In the
meantime, they were stuck in undesirable regions, separated from their
families, unable to pursue their professions, and generally impaired in their
livelihoods. The price of secrecy is high, indeed. What unites a lot of the
individuals on the no-fly list with those in Guantanamo and in other national
security settings is that once the government was forced to disclose the
information it was using to eliminate personal rights and freedoms, it often
either chose not to do so or was unable to sustain a valid case. The suspicion
arises that if we grant significant latitude to the government to maintain
secrecy over decisions and proceedings, the victory will belong not to liberty
interests but rather to unfettered power.
While the proposal in this Article does not purport to resolve all the
questions surrounding secrecy in the national security context, it takes an
important step in restoring the balance between security and individual
freedom. Further research is warranted before this model can be adapted to
other types of cases as well, but there is nothing inherently standing in the way
of using a similar standard to adjudicate different matters that rely on secret
factual determinations. This may include the judicial treatment of enemy
combatants or some of the decisions related to surveillance such as those made
by the FISA Court. It is at least worth considering the question in any scenario
where fundamental liberties are at stake, such as freedom from incarceration,
the right to travel, privacy interests, and so on. The fatalistic attitude that has
reigned in matters of secrecy must come to an end. Love him or hate him,
Edward Snowden’s revelations have shown that invasions into liberty do not
just happen to “other people” and that we are currently all at the mercy of the
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national security apparatus in one way or another.266 When the government
refuses to reveal its basis for inclusion on the list and further insists that race,
religion, and even protected speech can form part of its consideration, we
should assume that we are all a simple pen stroke away from being prevented
from boarding a plane.

266 Pastor Niemöller famously warned against such shortsighted self-interest: “Then they came for me—
and there was no one left to speak for me.” Martin Niemöller: “First They Came for the Socialists. . .”, U.S.
HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007392 (last
updated Jan. 29, 2016).

